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ABSTRACT: In addition to requiring subjective culpability, criminal
offenses typically involve two objective features: action and harm. In the
paradigmatic case, both features are present, but criminal law also allows
for liability where either of them is absent. Rules governing omission liability
enable punishment where the offender performs no act, while rules defining
inchoate crimes (such as attempt) impose liability where the offender causes
no harm. In different ways, these two sets of rules establish the minimum
threshold of objective conduct-to use the classic term, the minimum actus
reus-required for criminal liability.
The absolute floor for a criminal actus reus, then, would be defined by the
intersection of these two sets of rules. The prospect of liability for "inchoate
omissions "--involving no act and no harm-exists at the frontier of the
state's authority to criminalize conduct and, whether allowed or rejected,
effectively determines the outer boundaries of that authority. Accordingly,
inchoate-omission liability raises fundamental issues about the nature and
proper scope of criminal law.
This Article considers those issues, asking whether criminal punishment for
harmless inaction is legally possible, empirically observable, or normatively
desirable and, perhaps surprisingly, answering all three of these questions in
the affirmative. However unlikely or dubious the legal math may seem, it
turns out that zero action plus zero harm can, does, and sometimes should
add up to a crime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to requiring subjective culpability, crimes typically involve
two objective features: action and harm.1 In the paradigmatic case, both
features are present, as where the act of firing a gun 2 leads to the harm of a
person's death. Yet criminal law also has special rules enabling liability
where either of these features is absent. Rules governing omission liability
enable punishment where the offender performs no act. 3 Inchoate crimes,
typified by attempt, impose liability where the offender causes no harm.4 In
different ways, these two sets of rules establish the minimum threshold of
objective conduct-to use the classic term, the minimum "actus reus"-
required for criminal liability.
The absolute floor for a criminal actus reus, then, should be defined by
the intersection of these two sets of rules. Liability for what this Article
alternatively calls "inchoate omissions" or, perhaps more to the point,
"harmless inaction" would set the outer parameters of the state's
criminalization authority, at least in terms of objective or conduct-related
aspects (as opposed to culpability-related aspects) of crime. 5
1. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01 [A], at 85 (5th ed.
2009) (noting that the actus reus, or "physical or external portion of the crime[,] ... generally
includes three ingredients[,] . . . consist[ing] of (1) a voluntary act; (2) that causes; (3) social
harm" (footnote omitted)); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(b), at 10 (4th ed. 2003)
(noting that "basic premises" of criminal law include "the requirement of an act" and the sense
that "only harmful conduct should be made criminal").
2. Whether and when common descriptions such as "firing a gun" capture one or more
individual acts, or differing species of acts, are matters of considerable philosophical debate.
For a thorough discussion of the theory of action and its implications for criminal law, see
generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993). Because the focus of this Article is on omission
liability, this debate is largely irrelevant for present purposes. Rather, the significant distinction
is between action and inaction.
3. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 1, §§ 9.06-09, at 101-12 (discussing omissions and
omission liability); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique
of the Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 101 (1984).
4. DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.01, at 379-80. To be more precise, attempt liability
applies to situations where the offender fails to cause the harm addressed or contemplated by
some target offense. Attempts themselves may cause harm, as where they cause panic or fear in
the would-be victims, but liability for attempt does not require any such harm to occur. See id.
§ 27.02, at 380-82. One might also consider the risk of harm itself to be an independent harm.
See Part II.A (addressing this claim).
5. A similar but distinct category, also at the frontiers of criminal conduct, involves
complicity by omission. In complicity cases, the requisite harm does occur, but the defendant is
not its direct cause; instead, the harm-causing act of another person (the "principal") is
imputed to the defendant (the "accomplice") based on the accomplice's assistance to the
principal. In the complicity-by-omission case, the principal's act is imputed to the accomplice
based on the accomplice's failure to act-usually, the failure to affirmatively stop the principal
from performing the criminal conduct. For example, parents have been held liable as
accomplices to the assault of their children where they knew another person was beating the
1209
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The law limits the potential to impose criminal liability based on an
omission even where resulting harm occurs. A person may be punished for
her failure to act only where a legal duty bound her to act in order to
prevent the harm. 6 Classic examples of criminal omission involve legal
caregivers or guardians: the parent who fails to care for a child;7 the child
who fails to care for an elderly, infirm parent;8 or the healthcare worker who
fails to provide needed care to a patient in her charge.9 Where these
caregivers' failures to satisfy their legal duties of care lead to harm, they may
be subject to liability for neglect, battery, or even homicide. 10
But what if a similar caregiver showed similar neglect toward the person
in his charge, yet that person somehow managed to avoid harm-perhaps
only because of heroic medical intervention unsought by, and beyond the
control of, the neglectful caregiver? This caregiver would be bound by the
same duty, possess the same culpability, and engage in the same
inappropriate behavior as the one whose victim suffers harm. Only the
outcome would differ, and that difference would arise from factors
extraneous to the two caregivers' culpability, choices, and conduct. One
might think that this second caregiver is also a suitable candidate for
criminal punishment. Indeed, many criminal-law theorists seem to think
child but did not intervene. See, e.g., Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 875-76 (Ky.
1997).
Insofar as it allows for imposition of liability on one who neither acted nor caused
harm, the complicity-by-omission scenario has much in common with the inchoate-omission
scenario that this Article discusses. (One might also envision exotic combinations of the two,
such as the lawyer-accomplice who fails to prevent a client-principal from failing to report
required information to the authorities.) For the sake of clarity and avoiding confusion,
however, this Article focuses squarely on inchoate omissions rather than trying to address both
categories.
6. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 6.2 (a), at 311 ("For criminal liability to be based upon a failure
to act it must first be found that there is a duty to act-a legal duty and not simply a moral
duty."). A further requirement for liability is that the offender's inaction must have a sufficient
causal relationship to the harm. Of course, this rule is not peculiar to omissions; the causation
requirement exists for affirmative acts as well. See id. § 6.2(d), at 319 (discussing the particular
difficulty of establishing causation in omission cases); id. § 6.4, at 331-59 (discussing causation
generally).
7. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (affirming a
homicide conviction based on the parents' failure to seek medical attention for their sick
child).
8. See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth, 335 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (Va. 1985) (affirming a
conviction for involuntary manslaughter based on the breach of an implied agreement to care
for a parent). For a discussion of "filial responsibility" laws requiring adult children to support
their indigent parents, see generally Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and
Policy Considerations, 9J.L. & POL'Y 709 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339, 1344-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(affirming a homicide conviction based on the defendants' failure to provide food and medical
care as agreed).
10. See supra notes 7-9 (citing appellate decisions that affirmed homicide convictions
based on failures to provide care).
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SO. 11 At the same time, the prospect of punishment in the absence of either
action or harm might seem to set an unexpectedly, and perhaps
disturbingly, low floor for criminal liability-particularly in situations like
the typical case of harmless neglect, where not only are the usual objective
requirements lacking, but the offender's mental state reflects the minimum
degree of culpability (negligence) normally allowed to support criminal
liability.
This Article asks whether criminal punishment for harmless inaction is
ever legally possible, empirically observable, or normatively desirable-and,
perhaps surprisingly, answers all three of these questions in the affirmative.
In a remarkable legal sum, zero action plus zero harm can, and sometimes
does, add up to a crime. Further, this Article maintains that such liability is
not based on faulty math, but can be entirely appropriate, at least in some
circumstances.
Part II addresses the preliminary issue of defining the boundaries of the
inchoate-omission category. Parts III and IV explore the extent to which
existing law allows punishment for inchoate omissions. Criminal codes often
address inchoate conduct in two different ways. 12 First, a general attempt
provision will broadly impose liability for unsuccessful efforts to commit
some other target offense. Second, other particular offenses will define
specific situations where conduct is criminal regardless of whether it causes
harm. Part III explores attempt rules, and Part IV explores specific offenses
whose elements require neither action nor harm. Each Part examines the
existing law on the books and then investigates the enforcement of that law
(where it exists) to see whether and when prosecutions are brought for
offenses involving neither action nor harm. As it turns out, omission liability
is widely available for both types of inchoate crime-attempts and specific
offenses-but unevenly pursued as between those types: prosecution for
omissions under those attempt statutes appears to be hen's-tooth rare,
whereas prosecutions under more particular statutes, though hardly routine,
do occur with some frequency.
Part V offers some observations about the broader legal and normative
questions that inchoate-omission liability raises. Given that such liability
defines the outer boundaries of criminalization authority vis-A-vis objective
conduct, an initial issue is whether it should be allowed at all, and if so,
whether and how its substantive scope should be restricted.
If such liability is ever appropriate, a related issue arises as to what form
the criminal prohibition(s) should take-that is, whether it is desirable to
address omission liability using attempt law, particularized offenses, or both.
11. For a discussion of the position that the occurrence vel non of resulting harm should
be irrelevant to criminal liability, see Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design
of Criminal Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 879, 883 n.6, 898-99 (2007).
12. See generally id. (surveying and exploring the dual and often overlapping use of general
attempt provisions and specific offenses to impose criminal liability for inchoate conduct).
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Criminalization via a single, capacious attempt provision reflects an effort to
develop what I call a "dense" code, while adopting numerous, more specific
offenses generates what I call a "sprawling" code. Part V discusses the relative
advantages and drawbacks of pursuing density versus sprawl and considers
the lessons of this Article's investigation of inchoate omissions for the more
general questions about how to structure criminal law.
II DEFINING THE CATEGORY
Before examining the situations in which criminal law imposes liability
for inchoate omissions, it is necessary to specify more clearly what this
category includes. If inchoate liability and omission liability each cover
situations where some paradigmatic aspect of actus reus is missing, we must
identify the usually required element that goes missing in those situations
and understand why its absence might be troubling.
It is also important to recognize that the absence of either of these
elements might not be troubling. Some skepticism has already been
expressed about the relevance of harm13 and action 14 to criminal liability.
Even so, there has been little consideration of the implications of
abandoning both harm and action as predicates to criminal liability, or of
what objective requirements of criminality, if any, would remain if
punishment could be imposed in the absence of both action and harm.
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have expressed their willingness to
adopt an understanding of criminal liability based entirely on subjective
culpability-demanding only culpable risk-creation and not any resulting
harm or affirmative act 15-but few of the other commentators who have
13. Discussions of the irrelevance of harm to criminal liability often arise in the context of
a claim that the amount of liability should not depend on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
harm-in other words, that completed crimes should not be punished more harshly than
attempted crimes. See id. at 883 n.6, 898-99 & n.53 (discussing this claim and citing sources
making the claim).
14. See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 15 n.22 (2006) (citing sources that question the act requirement);
Vincent Chiao, Action and Agency in the Criminal Law, 15 LEGAL THEORY 1, 2 (2009)
("[O]rthodox Anglo-American criminal theory ... fails to explain adequately why criminal
responsibility requires an act.... [W]hat is sound in the intuition underlying the so-called 'act
requirement' is better explained by what I call the 'practical agency condition'...."); Michael
Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (1994)
("I will argue for these points: (1) There is no movement requirement in the criminal law; (2)
There may, however, be a requirement of physical conduct which would include both
movements and failures to move . . . ."); George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily
Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1443 (1994) (arguing for a de-emphasis on bodily movements in
defining the minimum requirements of criminal liability). But see GREEN, supra, at 15 ("[M]any
criminal law theorists would argue that every crime commission requires a physical act.");
DOUGLAS N. HuSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 84 (1987) ("[M]any theorists express
skepticism about whether a person should ever be punished for a failure to act.").
15. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 375, 378, 380 (2008) ("Our theory of the criminal law thus places all of its
1212 [2009]
A TTEMPT BY OMISSION
criticized the independent significance of action or harm seem willing to go
this far or seem to have contemplated the consequences of allowing liability
where neither action nor harm is present. 16 Moreover, neither Alexander
and Ferzan nor the other critics have undertaken, as this Article does, a
broader exploration of the extent to which inchoate-omission liability-
whether seen as good or bad-is allowed and pursued under the existing
law. 17 Before embarking on that exploration, however, let us clarify what we
seek to examine.
A. WHATISAN "INCHOATE" CRIME?
It is possible to distinguish three types of objective conduct that may be
subject to criminal sanction: harmful conduct, wrongful conduct, and
conduct that threatens a harm or wrong.i 8 First, and least controversially,
criminal law may impose liability for conduct that causes harm. 19 Probably
emphasis on the actor's choice to release an unjustifiable risk of har..... [O]missions, too,
can count as culpable acts on our account."). See generally LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY
KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009) (articulating their
theory in more detail).
16. Cf Jacobo Dopico G6mez-Aller, Criminal Omissions: A European Perspective, 11 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 419, 423 (2008) (noting the "perplexing questions raised by an examination of"
omission liability, including whether "an unconsummated offense of omission [is] punishable as
an attempt to commit an offense of harmful consequences"); Mark Perlman, Punishing Acts and
Counting Consequences, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 233-35 (1995) (explaining the difficulty of defining
omission crimes without reference to resulting harm).
British commentators are more openly supportive of inchoate-omission liability. See,
e.g., DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH & HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 414 (11 th ed. 2005) (claiming that lack of
omission liability is "an unfortunate gap in the law"). The United Kingdom's Law Commission
recently recommended changing British attempt law to allow liability for omissions. See LAW
COMM'N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 183, CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPTS 20, 169, 189 (2007),
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp183_web.pdf (noting that existing attempt law
does not seem to apply to omissions, and proposing that it should); cf id. at 189, 231
(speculating that liability for attempts by omission, if allowed, would be rare).
17. In addition to noting that British law does not allow liability for attempts by omission,
see supra note 16, the United Kingdom's Law Commission has noted that the laws of Canada,
New Zealand, and parts of Australia formally allow for such liability, but has not mentioned
whether or how often it has been imposed in those places. See LAW COMM'N, supra note 16, at
269-70, 273, 275.
One article, focusing on American offenses that penalize the failure to report
information to the government (typically information about criminal activity), has noted that
such laws involve omission liability and do not require any resulting harm. See Sandra Guerra
Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report" Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 6 (2002). However, the article does not explore the broader category of
inchoate-omission offenses or its general implications for criminal law.
18. Other requirements, most prominently mens rea requirements, further limit the
availability of criminal punishment for these types of objective conduct.
19. To be more precise, it is generally understood that the law may impose criminal
liability for conduct that harms another person or an institution. See, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1984) ("[T]he need to prevent harm (private or
public) to parties other than the actor is always an appropriate reason for legal coercion."). The
1213
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the most common understanding of the general limits of criminal law
applies some version of the "harm principle," under which it is at least prima
facie acceptable to criminalize conduct that causes harm.20 Depending on
the account offered, harm may or may not be a necessary or sufficient basis
for criminalization, but it is generally understood that significantly harmful
conduct and criminal conduct do and should overlap considerably. 21 Those
who oppose the harm principle usually do not claim that criminal law
cannot punish harmful conduct. Rather, they claim that criminal law can
reach beyond harmful conduct to cover a second category: conduct that is
harmless but nonetheless viewed as inherently morally wrongful or
offensive. 22 Commonly proffered examples of harmless wrongdoing include
breaking a gratuitous promise, 23 trespassing on property without damaging
it, 2 4 and mutilating a corpse.2 5 The suitability of criminal liability for
harmless wrongdoing is a matter of debate. 26
claim that this principle, and only this principle, can support criminalization is frequently traced
to John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859) ("[T he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.").
20. See, e.g., Dennis J. Baker, The Harm Principle vs Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair,
Principled andJust Criminalisation, 33 AUSTL.J. LEGAL PHIL. 66, 67 (2008) (concluding that the
harm principle is superior to Kant's deontological theory as a means of "ensuring that
criminalisation decisions are fair, just and principled"); Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and
Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 156 (1995) ("Commentators have
struggled to identify that subclass of wrongful conduct that is eligible for punishment. The harm
requirement provides the most plausible solution to this problem." (footnote omitted)); cf
Meir Dan-Cohen, Thinking Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2419, 2420-21 (2007) (noting
"the evolution of criminal law under the guidance of the harm principle," but criticizing this
approach); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
109, 113 (1999) (noting the prevalence of reliance on the harm principle, but complaining that
"[c]laims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become meaningless").
For an extended account exploring the relationship between the harm principle and the
justification of criminalization, see generally 1-4 FEINBERG, supra note 19 (1984-1988).
21. For principled defenses of this claim, see sources cited supra notes 19-20. For a
discussion of empirical research indicating that common moral intuitions support, or at least
overlap with, some version of the harm principle, see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban,
Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions offustice, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1829, 1860-65 (2007).
22. For one defense of the claim that liability for harmless wrongdoing is at least
sometimes acceptable, see Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong, 5 J. CON'TEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 157, 195, 209-14 (1994).
23. See I FEINIBERG, supra note 19, at 36.
24. See Hurd, supra note 22, at 213-14. But see I FEINBERG, supra note 19, at 34-35
(claiming that trespass creates harm independent of whether the land is left undamaged or
even improved, because the trespass invades a recognized legal interest in exclusive possession).
25. See Hurd, supra note 22, at 213; cf. I FEINBERG, supra note 19, at 94-95 (discussing the
general question of whether it is possible to "harm" or "wrong" a dead person).
26. For an extended discussion of whether criminalization of harmless wrongdoing is
justifiable, see generally 4 FEINBERG, supra note 19 (1988). Because this Article focuses on the
distinct category of inchoate liability, it need not take a position on the suitability of
criminalizing harmless wrongdoing or on any other question related to the ultimate harms (or
1214 [20091
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In addition to harmful and wrongful conduct, there is a third possible
object of criminalization: conduct that is neither harmful nor wrongful in
itself, but that threatens some harm or wrong. 27 Such conduct may involve
preliminary but as-yet-incomplete steps in the direction of the harm or
wrong, such as a meeting to discuss a planned robbery; or it may involve acts
that generate a risk of harm or wrong, such as speeding or firing a gun,
though no actual harm ensues.
Crimes involving conduct in this third category-the subject of this
Article-are variously described as "nonconsummate," "inchoate," or
"anticipatory" crimes. The terms "inchoate" and "anticipatory" are often
used to describe offenses involving preliminary conduct that is directed
toward some other defined offense (sometimes called the "target" or
"object" offense). 28 For example, the elements of attempt are set out as a
function of efforts toward another offense. The terms are also sometimes
used for freestanding offenses-such as possession offenses-whose
elements exist independently and do not explicitly require the offender to
be risking or planning some other offense. 29 This Article uses the term
"inchoate" to describe any offense that neither requires harm nor involves
behavior considered inherently wrongful or immoral.30 Employing Douglas
Husak's formulation of the concept, an "offense is inchoate if it proscribes
conduct that does not cause harm on each and every occasion in which it is
performed."3 1
One difficulty with inchoate liability lies in determining its exact object
or scope: if such liability demands no harm or wrong, precisely what does it
wrongs) that criminal law may address. As the text indicates, inchoate liability raises
independent issues regarding how far criminal law may go in proscribing conduct that does not
cause, but merely risks, such harms or wrongs, whatever they may be.
27. For further discussion of how and why this category is distinct from the first two, see
Hurd, supra note 22, at 187-93. See also id. at 213 n.79 ("[T]here are good reasons to resist
suggestions that attempts are either harms or wrongs. .. ").
28. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (1989)
("'Inchoate' offenses allow punishment of an actor even though he has not consummated the
crime that is the object of his efforts."); id. at 3 n.5 (using the terms "object" or "target" to
describe "an offense to which an inchoate or anticipatory crime relates," and claiming that
"[a]n inchoate crime must have another crime as its object").
29. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 9.03[C], at 96-97 ("Crimes of possession are
'inchoate,' or incomplete, offenses. That is, their real purpose is to provide the police with a
basis for arresting those whom they suspect will later commit a socially injurious act . . .");
Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the
Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 765-66 (1988) (giving numerous examples of specific
offenses "defined in the inchoate mode").
30. Of course, the conduct may be considered wrongful to the extent that it risks harm,
but this is not the same as being per se wrongful.
31. DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 160
(2008); see also Husak, supra note 20, at 158, 163-69 (offering a similar definition for
"nonconsummate offense," and further elaborating on the concept of a nonconsummate
offense).
1215
94 IOWA LA WPREVIEW
demand? Not much has been said about the nature of inchoate crimes as a
category. Scholars typically define or categorize them only in the negative-
as crimes that are not consummate-and even this distinction is
unexplained.3 2 The most thorough account of the nature and proper limits
of inchoate liability comes from Husak, who characterizes inchoate offenses
as demanding the creation of a sufficient risk of harm, even though harm
itself need not occur. 33
It seems the only other articulated position about the nature of
inchoate liability is that inchoate crimes are characterized not by risk, but
rather by the offender's intent to engage in harmful or wrongful conduct. 34
Under this view, a person's affirmative desire or purpose to bring about
some criminal harm or wrong defines and supports inchoate liability. s 5
Husak rejects this position on the ground that it makes the consummate-
inchoate distinction "defendant-relative," so that a given crime's status as
inchoate or complete depends on the individual offender's motivations
rather than the nature or definition of the offense itself.3 6 Like Husak, I
reject the intent-based conception of inchoate offenses, though for slightly
32. See Husak, supra note 20, at 165-66 ("[F]ew theorists propose an explicit definition of
nonconsummate offenses at all. Instead, most commentators simply list examples of such
offenses, inviting the reader to formulate his own definition." (footnote omitted)).
33. See id. at 164 ("The conduct proscribed by a nonconsummate offense creates a risk of
harm-at least when such an offense is justified."). In a more recent articulation that suggests a
willingness to criminalize moral wrongs as well as harms, Husak says that inchoate offenses risk
"harm or evil." HUSAK, supra note 31, at 160.
34. See Husak, supra note 20, at 166 ("The most familiar answer to th[e] question [of what
makes an offense inchoate] .. .invokes the mental state of the defendant. Typically, the
relevant mental state is the aim, objective, end, or purpose of the defendant.").
35. R.A. Duff draws a somewhat similar distinction between what he calls "attacks," which
involve an intentional effort to violate another person's rights, and what he calls
"endangerments," which do not. See R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangenment, 65 LA. L. REV. 941,
942-52 (2005) (describing the distinction between attacks and endangerments). I discuss Duff's
formulation elsewhere. Cahill, supra note 11, at 903-05, 931-32. In any case, Duffs distinction is
not critical here, as he uses it not to define the boundary between consummate and inchoate
crime, but rather to differentiate between two subcategories of inchoate crime.
36. See Husak, supra note 20, at 166-68. Husak states:
Two defendants might perform instances of the same crime with different ends or
objectives; according to Dressler's conception, the crime could be consummate
relative to one defendant, but nonconsummate relative to another. Suppose, for
example, that D, steals food with a different "end, objective, plan or purpose" than
D2. Suppose that Di steals food in order to eat it; D2 steals food in order to sell it. If
Di is arrested after [s]he has eaten the food, but D2 is arrested before he has sold
it, Di but not D2 has attained her end by her act of theft. Similarly, if Di is arrested
before [s]he has eaten the food, but D2 is arrested after he has sold it, D2 but not
D1 has attained [his) end by [his] act of theft. A conception of a nonconsummate
offense that invokes the perpetrator's mental state entails that one person but not
the other has committed a consummate offense, even though both have
committed the same crime.
Id. at 167.
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different reasons. Understanding inchoate crimes in terms of an offender's
motivations or culpability, rather than the risks that his objective conduct
creates, poorly suits the present task of specifying the nature and limits of
the state's criminalization authority. Subjective intent, as opposed to
objective risk, is both overinclusive and underinclusive as a criterion for
criminalization.
Basing criminalization on intent is overinclusive in that it allows liability
based solely on the offender's culpability, without requiring any showing of
objective harm or wrong (or even risk of a harm or wrong). Such a criterion
effectively bases the scope of criminalized activity entirely on individuals'
subjective perceptions about the risks of their behavior. Such a focus is not
without its adherents, 37 but it would entail outcomes that strike many as
troubling, as it would allow liability for those whose conduct presents no
actual danger or risk of harm-the so-called "inherently unlikely" attempt, 38
where a person seeks to cause harm but employs a means, such as voodoo, 39
that does not in fact make the harm more likely.
Basing criminalization on intent is also underinclusive because criminal
liability can and should attach to nonintentional though culpable risk-
taking. For example, conduct that recklessly creates a substantial risk of
harm is a common, and proper, object of criminal sanction. 40 The intent-
based approach to inchoate liability draws an arbitrary line between intent
and other forms of culpability. A risk-based approach, on the other hand,
can punish various degrees of culpable risk-creation while still retaining the
ability to punish the vast majority of cases involving intent, since a person's
intent to cause harm typically creates or reflects an actual risk of harm. 41
The only conduct that would be reached by an intent-based approach while
simultaneously evading a risk-based approach would be conduct in the
"inherently unlikely" category noted above-yet this category is extremely
small and somewhat controversial as an object of criminal liability. 42
37. See generally, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 15 (advocating the use of subjective
perception of risk, rather than objective risk-creation, as the basis for criminal liability).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1962).
39. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 293-95
(2d ed. 2008) (discussing the case of John Henry Ivy, a convicted robber who tried to kill a
sentencing judge using voodoo).
40. For references to existing offenses that punish various forms of reckless (or even
negligent) endangerment, see Cahill, supra note 11, at 922-36. For a normative defense of
liability for inchoate crimes of recklessness, see id. at 890-903.
41. See Husak, supra note 20, at 172.
42. See, e.g., Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model
Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 244-51 (1995) (discussing issues surrounding "inherently
unlikely" attempts, and proposing a slight reformulation of the Model Penal Code's treatment
of them); Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523,
546-49 (2008) (proposing a test for impossible-attempt liability that would demand a genuine
threat to protected interests).
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Whether inchoate offenses are better understood as involving the intent
to cause harm or, as I have argued, the objective risk of harm, one can
understand the proper scope of inchoate liability only if one has a clear
definition of what constitutes harm. 43 Though this Article does not seek to
articulate a full-fledged theory of harm, it is necessary at this point to address
two views of harm (or more accurately, views holding that specific things
qualify as harms) that threaten to collapse the distinction between
consummate and inchoate offenses entirely. First, some have argued that the
risk of harm is itself a harm.44 Obviously, if this view were accurate, the
definition of inchoate offenses just articulated-which distinguishes them
from consummate offenses on the ground that they do not cause, but only
risk, harm-would be untenable, for it would fail to mark a relevant
difference between inchoate and consummate offenses.
Others have convincingly rejected the position that risk is a harm. 45
Stated simply, it is either implausible or inaccurate to define "harm" such
that a person can be harmed without knowing about it and without any
identifiable setback to the person's interests. Only the ex ante prospect of
harm is relevant; after "suffering" the risk itself, the "victim" bears no trace
of having "suffered" and differs in no detectable way from one who was not
exposed to the risk. Accordingly, the amount a person would pay ex post to
avoid exposure to a risk that is now known not to have resulted in any direct
harm is zero-just as no property owner would pay to insure against past
risks of fire or flood, though those risks may have existed. This being the
case, it makes little sense to say that the person has been harmed by the risk
itself. Of course, a person's perception that he (or another person he cares
about) will be, or has been, subjected to a risk may lead the person to
experience distress or trauma, and that distress can easily be seen as a
43. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 132-33 (1978). Fletcher
notes:
Liability for an attempted offense is a paradigmatic instance of an inchoate
offense .... In other contexts, however, it is more difficult to assess whether a
defined offense is an "inchoate" or a "consummated" offense .... Absent a
catalogue of harms that the law seeks to prevent, the distinction between inchoate
and consummated offenses proves to be illusive.
Id.
44. See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 998-1000 (2003)
(arguing that risk is a harm).
45. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1444 (2003) ("My Article does not resolve the criminal or tort
law status of risk imposition. Rather, it makes an important contribution to the debate about
that status, by showing that one important argument in favor of liability-the argument that
risking is itself a kind of consequential harming-must be abandoned."); Stephen R. Perry,
Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 321, 330-39 (David
C. Owen ed., 1995) (examining and rejecting the argument that risk is in itself a harm).
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harm. 46 A criminal offense whose elements required the offender to cause
actual psychological harm would therefore qualify as a consummate offense.
Yet that intangible, psychological harm is distinct from the underlying
exposure to an actual objective risk. The harm may arise even where there is
no actual risk, and it may fail to arise in many cases where objective risk is
present. The risk itself, then, is not a harm, and an offense that requires only
creation of a risk but not proof of any resulting harm-physical or
psychological-is an inchoate offense.
A second position complicating the harm-risk distinction is the view
that efforts to cause a prohibited harm, even if they fail to cause that harm,
generate some other social harm, perhaps by demonstrating a disregard for
law and order.47 This manifest lack of concern for social norms or values
might undermine social cohesion or promote lawlessness among others.48
Yet, as with the psychological harm that might attend a risk, the purported
social harm may or may not occur as a result of any specific instance of risk-
taking activity. If the public never learns about that activity, then no
disruption of order or threat to social norms will occur. In fact, some risk-
taking activity that would otherwise remain unknown (precisely because no
actual harm ensues) might be revealed by the law-enforcement process of
detecting and prosecuting that activity, thereby bringing it to light and
making it public. But it would surely be odd to suggest that law enforcement
is harmful because it might make the public aware of unlawful activity.
Further, the social-harm position is problematic as an explanation of the
justification for, and limits of, the state's ability to impose inchoate liability,
for it seems circular. The source of the purported social harm is the fact of
criminalization itself: the existence of the law is what makes the manifest
"lawlessness" harmful. In that case, though, the identification of lawlessness
as a harm is not doing any useful work in explaining the proper reach of
46. See Adler, supra note 45, at 1440 ("To be sure, risk imposition construed in a different
way-in actual, first-party terms-is harmful, at a minimum if the actual beliefs . . . are a
component of fear, anxiety, or some other epistemic-affective hybrid. 'Emotional harm' is a
genuine harm."); Perry, supra note 45, at 338-39 (distinguishing between risk exposure and
psychological harm).
47. See Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal
Liability, 23 UCLA L. REv. 266, 269 (1975). Robinson states:
I will contend ... that the inchoate offenses do not punish bad intent evidenced by
overt acts, but rather punish conduct which is harmful to society in a way apart
from the harm which might have resulted had the actor's intent been fulfilled. The
harm is intangible in character, and society is its object. Inchoate offenses not only
create a risk of harm, they are harms in themselves.
Id. (footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 141-45 (expressing the view that attempts are
properly criminalized based on a reflection of "manifest criminality" that generates public
apprehension); cf. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 468-78 (1997) (discussing the potential of lawlessness to promote further lawlessness).
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criminalization authority; commission of any inchoate crime becomes
harmful by virtue of the criminal prohibition itself.
For purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to specify what qualifies as
a harm and what harms are proper subjects of criminalization; this Article
merely requires that harm, whatever it is, be meaningfully distinguished
from the mere risk of harm. Inchoate offenses are those that do not require
harm, but only risk. As the discussion in Part III demonstrates, nearly all
offenses that qualify as inchoate under this formulation are easy to
categorize as such and to distinguish from offenses that demand actual
harm. Indeed, many such offenses are explicitly defined to require only a
risk of some relevant harm rather than the harm itself. Others define the
offense purely in terms of prohibited conduct-usually conduct that seems
highly likely to correspond to some harm or risk of harm-without directly
requiring the actual occurrence of harm or, in many cases, even a
demonstrable risk of harm.
B. WHAT IS A CRIME OF OMISSION?
Omission liability can be defined somewhat more easily than inchoate
liability. An omission is simply a failure to act, and omission liability is
liability that is imposed for a mere failure to act. One complication, though,
is that many courses of conduct involve a mixture of actions and omissions
and can be described either in terms of what a person has done (e.g., "you
were off playing golf") or in terms of what the person has failed to do (e.g.,
"you were neglecting your family"), or both. Understanding whether an
alleged criminal offense rests on action or a failure to act is a matter of
identifying the conduct for which the offender is culpable or blameworthy.
In a case involving omission liability, the offender does not have the
requisite culpability with respect to any affirmative acts, but rather is
culpable with respect to his failure to act.49
One category of conduct that is controversial in terms of whether it
constitutes an act or an omission is possession. Some characterize possession
as an affirmative act, others as an omission. In one effort to finesse the issue,
the Model Penal Code defined possession to be an act so long as the
possessor has sufficient opportunity to divest himself of the item possessed. 5
If possession were seen not as an act, but as an omission-specifically, a
failure to relinquish control over the property in question-then criminal
offenses whose only objective requirement is possession 5' would constitute
49. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 15, at 385-88 (arguing for omission liability based
on the culpable choice not to abate an identifiable existing risk).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (1962) ("Possession is an act . . . if the possessor
knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a
sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.").
51. Many such offenses have additional culpability requirements beyond the offender's
culpability as to possession itself. For example, the offense may require that one possess illicit
1220 (20091
ATTEMPT B Y OMISSION
inchoate-omission offenses under this Article's framework. Possession
offenses are inchoate rather than consummate: possession itself is not
harmful and typically not seen as wrongful, but merely as creating a risk of
some other harm. Hence, if possession is an omission rather than an act,
offenses criminalizing mere possession are inchoate-omission offenses.
Obviously, inclusion of possession offenses within the category would greatly
expand the extent to which existing criminal law defines and prosecutes
crimes of inchoate omission. Possession offenses may be controversial
precisely because they fit into this category: they differ from other offenses
not only because they prohibit conduct whose status as action is dubious, or
because they prohibit conduct that creates a mere likelihood of harm rather
than actual harm, but because they combine both of these features. 52
Indeed, possession offenses are especially extreme possible examples of
inchoate-omission offenses because they extend the scope of omission
liability beyond its usual boundaries-that is, beyond situations where the
law imposes an affirmative duty to act. These offenses prohibit possession
across the board, so that the prohibition applies to all people at all times
rather than only specified people in particular situations. Of course, the
offenses could simply be seen as defining a new legal duty not to possess
contraband, and the law is presumably free to define such new duties, so
long as they do not run afoul of the Constitution. Still, even possession
offenses that raise no obvious constitutional issues will seem troubling
because, and to the extent that, they involve only minimal or even
nonexistent demands in terms of the objective action or harm required for
liability. Indeed, many such offenses do not even explicitly require the
offender to create a risk of any specified harm, but simply ban an entire
range of (in)activity that seems generally to correlate with a risk of harm,
though specific instances of it may well be completely harmless. 53
narcotics with the additional intention of selling them. But so long as possession is the only
objective requirement, possession offenses involve inchoate omissions.
52. The same is true for so-called "status offenses," which criminalize a general trait or
characteristic rather than any specific conduct. These offenses demand no overt action, and the
traits they criminalize--such as drug addiction or gang membership-are not inherently
wrongful or harmful but seem to correlate with some potential for harm. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra
note 1, § 6.1(d), at 307 (describing crimes that punish status rather than acts or omissions).
Pure status offenses, however, are typically held unconstitutional and thus do not demand
additional independent discussion. Id.; see also id. § 3.3(d), at 149-50 (discussing the extent to
which mental state and act are constitutionally required); id. § 3.5(f), at 180-82 (discussing the
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a statute criminalizing
narcotics addiction).
53. See Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, I BUFF.




III. OMISSION AND ATTEMPT
A. LAw
However conceptually unusual it may seem that one could attempt a
crime by doing nothing, many American criminal codes allow for just such a
possibility. For example, the Model Penal Code's attempt provision explicitly
allows for omission liability: an attempt occurs when one "does or omits to do
anything that . . . is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime." 54
The criminal codes of seven states allow attempt liability for omissions in
similarly explicit terms.55 Another sixteen states are less direct but effectively
reach the same result, as they define attempt in terms of a requisite amount
of "conduct,"56 and their codes elsewhere define "conduct" to include both
acts and omissions.
57
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962) (emphasis added); see also id. § 5.01(1)(b)
(declaring that for a crime requiring a result, an attempt occurs when one "does or omits to do
anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without
further conduct on his part" (emphasis added)).
The Model Penal Code's commentary says nothing about why or when attempt liability
would arise for an omission, rather than an act or series of acts-itself an interesting omission,
particularly since the final version of the Model Penal Code strengthens the reference to
omission liability relative to the initial circulated draft of the attempt provision. See id.
§ 5.01 (1)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960) (referring to one who "does or omits to do anything
which . . . is a substantial step," i.e., including the final version's first reference to omission but
lacking its second reference). The earlier draft's commentary also fails to elaborate on the basis
or scope of omission liability for attempt.
55. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1001(A)(2) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-49(a)(2)
(2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531(2) (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.010(1)(b) (West
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27(A) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1(1) (2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1 (a) (2)-(3) (West 2005).
56. To be precise, only twelve of the sixteen states achieve this result by describing
attempts in terms of "conduct"-typically, "conduct which [or that] constitutes a substantial
step" toward the offense. ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(a) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-201 (a) (2),
(b) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500(1)(b) (1993);
IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (a) (1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152(A) (2006) ("conduct that
in fact constitutes a substantial step"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-201 (1) (b) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-06-01 (1) (1997) ("conduct which, in fact, constitutes a substantial step"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.405(1) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(1) (2008); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.00
(McKinney 2004) ("conduct which tends to effect the commission of [a] crime"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.02(A) (LexisNexis 2006) ("conduct that, if successful, would constitute or
result in the offense").
The Illinois, Michigan, and Montana codes appear to do the same thing as the twelve
other codes, but in a somewhat unusual way. They define attempt to require an "act" toward the
commission of an offense. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4(a) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.92 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103(1) (2007). Yet they define "act" to include
omissions. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2 (2006); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.10 (West 2004);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(1) (2007). Finally, Missouri's code has its own unique spin on that
already unusual definitional turn, as it defines attempt to require an "act," Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 564.011 (1) (2000), yet it does not define the term "act"-it only defines the term "voluntary
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For another ten American jurisdictions, it is less clear whether attempt
liability based on an omission is possible under the law. Five codes-four
state codes 58 and the federal criminal code-do not have a general attempt
provision at all. Two of those five-the Code of Iowa and the United States
Code-instead have provisions creating specific attempt offenses, such as
attempted murder.5 9 Iowa's elaboration of attempt seems to allow for
attempt by omission, 6° while the federal code is unclear. 6 1 The other three
states with no general attempt provision have developed attempt doctrine
exclusively through case law; in doing so, none appears to have dealt with
the question of attempt by omission. 62 Another five codes have provisions
simply prohibiting any "attempt" to commit an offense, without defining or
act," and defines that term to include omissions. Id. § 562.011(2). Accordingly, the status of
attempt by omission may be more dubious under the Missouri code than under the other codes
in this category.
57. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(7) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-201(3) (2006); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(2) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-118(4) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
109(5) (2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00(4) (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01(1)
(1997) (requiring as a basis for criminal liability "conduct, including an act, an omission, or
possession"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (A)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring as a basis for
criminal liability "conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act
or duty that the person is capable of performing"); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(4) (2007); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (4) (2008).
Indiana's code does not define "conduct," but it includes a provision requiring
"conduct" as a basis for criminal liability and imposing supplementary rules for omissions,
indicating that omissions are a subset of"conduct." See IND. CODE § 35-41-2-1 (a) (1998).
Maine's code also does not define "conduct," but it includes a defense for "involuntary
conduct" that strongly suggests that both acts and omissions count as conduct. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103-B (2006) ("It is a defense that, when a person causes a result or engages in
forbidden conduct, the person's act or omission to act is involuntary.").
For the provisions of Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Montana, see supra note 56.
58. Iowa, Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006) (punishing the specific offenses of attempted murder and
attempted manslaughter); IOWA CODE § 707.11 (2009) (defining the specific offense of
attempted murder).
60. As with the codes of Illinois, Michigan, and Montana, see supra note 56, Iowa's code
defines attempted murder to require an "act," IOWA CODE § 707.11 (2009), but it defines "act"
to include omissions. See id. § 702.2.
61. Like the five codes discussed next in the text, see infra note 63 and accompanying text,
the United States Code uses but does not define the term "attempt." See 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006).
62. Maryland and North Carolina have no general provision defining attempt, but they do
have provisions addressing the grading of attempts for sentencing purposes. MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 1-201 (LexisNexis 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2.5 (2007). Maryland also has
specific provisions for "attempt to commit murder in the second degree" and "attempted
poisoning," which carry specified punishment ranges. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-206, 3-
213 (LexisNexis 2002). To the extent the grading provisions imply a catchall, undefined
category of punishable criminal attempts, these states would belong with the five jurisdictions
mentioned next in the text. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. Rhode Island defines no
attempt offenses whatsoever in its code.
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otherwise clarifying that term. 63 Here again, case law supplies the actual
content of the attempt rules, and here again, none of these jurisdictions
seems to have addressed the issue of attempt by omission.
The remaining nineteen state criminal codes have attempt provisions
whose terms appear to disallow liability based on an omission, as they
require performance of an "act."64 To summarize, twenty-four state criminal
codes appear to permit imposition of criminal liability for attempts by
omission-seven explicitly, and another seventeen (including Iowa) by
referring to attempts as involving "conduct" or "acts" that can include
omissions. An additional nine American codes, including the federal code
and the District of Columbia code, are ambiguous in that they either do not
discuss attempt at all or do not define the term. Depending on the status of
attempt-by-omission liability in the ambiguous jurisdictions, roughly one-half
to two-thirds of American jurisdictions allow prosecution for attempt by
omission. But do such prosecutions ever occur? The next Section addresses
that question.
B. ENFORCEMENT
Notwithstanding the rather common legal availability of criminal
punishment for attempt by omission, such punishment seems to be
exceedingly rare. For the thirty-three jurisdictions whose codes do, or might,
63. D.C. CODE § 22-1803 (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-306 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1-80 (2003) (referring to "the common law offense of attempt"); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-25
to -26 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-8 (LexisNexis 2005).
64. ALA. CODE § 13A-4-2(a) (LexisNexis 2005) ("overt act"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 21a (West
1999) ("direct but ineffectual act"); FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-1
(2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 274, § 6 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 609.17 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-1-7 (2006) ("overt act"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.330(1) (2007); N.M. STAT. § 30-28-1 (2004)
("overt act"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(a) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 22-4-1 (2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-12-101 (a) (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (a) (Vernon 2003); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 9(a) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.020(1) (2008); WIs. STAT. § 939.32(3)
(2007-2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301 (a) (i) (2007).
Two states present slightly unusual cases. First, Kansas-like Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Montana, and (perhaps) Missouri, see supra notes 56, 60-defines "act" to include omissions.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3110(1) (2007). Its attempt provision, however, requires an "overt act," id.
§ 21-3301(a) (emphasis added), which suggests that omission would not suffice. Second,
Oklahoma's attempt provision sets out rules only for "completed" attempts-i.e., attempts for
which the target offense's requisite result could have occurred without any further conduct by
the attempter, but failed to occur in the case at hand (such as a "shoot and miss" scenario). See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 44 (2001). The only suggestion that liability will lie for incomplete
attempts appears in Oklahoma's grading provision for attempts, which refers to one who
"attempts to commit any crime, and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of
such crime, but fails." Id. § 42. In any case, both the attempt provision (which applies only to
one who "does" something) and the grading provision (which applies to one who "does any
act") seem to require action and disallow omission liability.
Unlike the codes of Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Montana, see supra notes 56, 60, there
is no indication that these codes (except Kansas, asjust described) understand the term "act" to
include omissions.
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permit such punishment, a review of appellate decisions-an admittedly
imperfect and incomplete method of searching for the full universe of
prosecutions or convictions-reveals only two cases involving attempts by
omission.
Both cases are from Louisiana, and both involved defendants who were
charged with "cruelty" or neglect offenses but were convicted only of
attempted cruelty. State v. Cortez, decided in 1996, reversed the attempted-
juvenile-cruelty conviction of a mother who had allegedly failed to seek
medical treatment for her six-month-old son's leg injury. 65 State v. Smith,
decided in 2004, affirmed a conviction for attempted "cruelty to the infirm"
of a woman who had failed to bathe, move, or otherwise aid her elderly
mother as she lay on a sofa for over a month. 66 Interestingly, though both of
the appealed convictions were for attempt, which requires no resulting
harm, the presence or absence of injury was relevant to the ultimate
disposition of each case. The primary analysis in each related to whether the
evidence was sufficient to support conviction for the completed, rather than
the attempted, crime (in which case, the lesser conviction for attempt would
stand) .67
In another case not directly involving an attempt prosecution, the
Tennessee Supreme Court suggested the potential for attempt-by-omission
liability. 68 Paramedics who were summoned to treat the defendant's wife
entered the defendant's home only to find filthy, foul-smelling conditions,
with a baby half-buried in a pile of trash and two other children sleeping
under a roach-infested blanket. 69 The defendant was charged with child
neglect, convicted, and sentenced to forty months' imprisonment. 70 The
court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed
the reversal, concluding that the statute in question required proof of an
"actual, deleterious effect or harm" to the children's health. 7' The court
proceeded to conclude, however, that the defendant could be subject to
65. State v. Cortez, 687 So. 2d 515, 516-17, 524 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
66. State v. Smith, 870 So. 2d 618, 619, 622-24 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
67. See id. at 625 ("Because the record supports a finding of guilt to the offense charged,
the jury did not err in finding the defendant guilty of the lesser offense of attempted cruelty to
the infirm."); Cortez, 687 So. 2d at 519-22 (addressing the sufficiency of the evidence to support
conviction for the completed crime, and questioning whether the defendant's failure to seek
treatment worsened her child's condition or otherwise caused the requisite "pain or suffering");
see also id. at 522-24 (addressing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the attempted
crime).
68. See State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d 666, 672-78 (Tenn. 2001) (discussing attempted child
neglect). It may be worth noting that the facts and charges, summarized in the text, are similar
to other cases charging neglect under more specific, non-attempt inchoate offenses, as
discussed in Part IV.B.
69. Id. at 668.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 672.
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liability for attempted child neglect, holding that such an attempt would
require proof only of intent to engage in neglectful conduct and not of
intent to cause harm. 72
Why are there so few prosecutions for attempt by omission when almost
half the states recognize liability for such attempts? The general lack of
prosecutions for attempts based on omissions must involve some
combination of three possible explanations: (1) there are simply few cases of
attempt by omission out in the world; (2) there are cases, but they avoid
detection; and/or (3) there are cases that are detected, but those cases do
not get prosecuted.
As to the first explanation, cases that factually satisfy the elements of
attempt by omission may be rare not only because of the lack of conduct,
but also because of the lack of requisite culpability. Attempt typically
requires intent, and many omissions are likely to reflect some lower degree
of culpability. 73 One who affirmatively seeks to bring about some result or
state of affairs is likely to do something to achieve it, so it seems reasonable
that cases involving both intent and failure to act would be relatively
unusual. On the other hand, lesser degrees of culpability, involving
inattention to some risk of harm rather than a conscious effort to cause
harm, seem more likely to accompany or underlie a person's failure to take
action in a situation. Accordingly, cases of reckless endangerment by
omission might arise even though cases of attempted murder by omission
might be very rare. The Cortez decision suggests such a view in its skepticism
about the applicability of attempt liability, with its "specific intent"
requirement, to the state's child-neglect offense-a classic omission crime,
and one that requires only "general intent," or criminal negligence. 74
As to the second explanation, it makes sense that in the absence of the
usual objective, observable hallmarks of criminal activity-action and
harm-behavior that satisfies the technical legal requirements of attempt by
omission would nonetheless be hard to spot. Dangerous activity is more
72. See id. at 672-78. Note, however, that Tennessee's attempt provision requires an "act,"
see supra note 64, so with respect to omission-based liability, the Mateyko dictum might not bear
scrutiny were a court to confront directly the question of punishing attempted neglect.
73. See, e.g., Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 600-07 (1958)
(discussing mens rea in the context of omissions); Recent Case, United States v. Golden, 466
F3d 612 (7th Cir. 2006), 120 HARv. L. REV. 2012, 2016 (2007) ("Traditionally, the criminal
justice system has treated omissions with considerably less severity than affirmative misconduct,
in part because it is more difficult to deduce pertinent intentionality from the former.").
74. See State v. Cortez, 687 So. 2d 515, 522-24 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the attempt
provision's "specific intent" requirement and questioning the general suitability of attempt
liability for the juvenile-cruelty offense); id. at 519-20 (discussing the cruelty offense's
culpability requirements); cf. infra Part IVA (discussing specific inchoate crimes of omission,
including neglect offenses). As noted above, Smith was able to affirm an attempt conviction
while avoiding the question of intent by considering and upholding the sufficiency of the
evidence to support conviction for the completed crime, which did not require intent. See supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing Smith).
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likely to be recognized than dangerous inactivity, and resulting harm can
often be noticed after the fact, while an unrealized risk of harm cannot.
The second explanation ties into the third: even when the available
information appears to indicate a case of attempt by omission, proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt may be difficult. Again, Cortez and Smith seem to
be exceptions that prove this rule: although the trials in those cases resulted
in attempt convictions-apparently due to compromise verdicts-the
underlying facts suggested some actual injury to the victims necessitating
medical treatment, without which the cases would never have come to the
attention of officials.
A final, yet fundamental, complication here is the difficulty of
articulating a clear conceptual explanation of when an omission would ripen
into an attempt. Defining the boundary between "mere preparation" and
criminal attempt is notoriously difficult even when a person engages in
affirmative acts pursuant to a criminal objective. 75 But determining whether
and when a person's inaction amounts to a "substantial step" in the direction
of a crime seems a truly overwhelming task. When affirmative acts are
involved, one can at the very least recognize when an attempt is
"complete"-that is, when the person's conduct would have caused the
result in question but for some fortuitous circumstance. Yet in situations
involving omission, even completed attempts prove elusive. At what point
has someone performed enough of an omission-done enough of nothing-
for the crime to occur? In the abstract, any amount of nothing should be as
good as any other amount.
This conceptual puzzle is not just an abstruse head-scratcher, but may
pose a significant difficulty for those criminal-law theorists-and there are a
number of them-who think that resulting harm should be irrelevant to the
criminal law. 76 Those theorists argue that there should be no legal
distinction between attempts and completed crimes. Yet in cases of omission
75. See Cahill, supra note 11, at 908-10 (discussing the difficulty of determining whether
conduct constitutes an attempt).
76. See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
597, 601 n.14 (2001) (citing various theorists, including herself, who take this position); see also
Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1176 n.78 (1997) (noting the authors' position that "results should never
matter for criminal liability"); Ashworth, supra note 29, at 764 ("[Rlesulting harm is not of
central importance to the imposition or the grade of criminal liability."); Sanford H. Kadish,
The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 686 (1994)
("[P]unishing attempts and completed crimes differently makes no sense insofar as the goal of
the criminal law is to identify and deal with dangerous offenders who threaten the public.");
Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 390
(concluding after analysis that "results should play no role in desert or punishment"); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1607 (1974) ("[Mlany problems associated with mens rea and the
law of attempts have never been resolved satisfactorily, due to the absence of acceptable or
coherent reasons for attributing significance to the harm caused .... ").
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liability, it seems unusually tricky, if not impossible, to determine whether an
offender's inaction suffices to ground liability, except by reference to
whether the prohibited harm has actually occurred and is causally
attributable to the offender's failure to act. Accordingly, it appears that
either this aspect of criminal law must take account of the presence or
absence of resulting harm, or else the theorists who ignore resulting harm
must abandon the possibility of omission liability, at least for crimes defined
in terms of conduct seeking a particular result. 77
One possible way to get around this problem would be to criminalize
identifiable omissions that occur in particular contexts and create particular
risks. 78 This might avoid the difficulty of determining when an omission
77. See Perlman, supra note 16, at 233-34. Perlman states:
One category for which the consequence-irrelevance theory fares particularly
badly is crimes of omission .... If a mother puts her infant on a park bench in
winter and leaves the infant there to die, she has in one sense not done anything to
the child. . . . If consequences are not at all relevant to the specification of any
crime, then what sort of crime is this so-called "crime of omission"? ...
. . . [I]n many cases omissions are crimes only if harm occurs, and if no harm
occurs there is no crime at all. Without appeal to the consequences, we either have
to jail anyone who (intentionally or recklessly) omits the specified action, or
punish no one, even if some of them allow innocent babies to die. Either way, it
seems that somebody goes to jail who should not or somebody does not go to jail
who should.
Id.; see also LAW COMM'N, supra note 16, at 181 (noting that an earlier Commission report
suggested that "'it is difficult to give any meaning' to the concept of an attempt by way of an
omission to act"); cf id. at 231 ("We acknowledge that there may be conceptual difficulties
associated with identifying preparatory-and therefore more than merely preparatory--
omissions. However, there can clearly be some situations where D's conduct is such that he or
she is clearly 'on the job' even though there is no positive act .. ").
The theorists might respond that their theory allows for omission liability without
making any accommodation for the occurrence of results, and that any limits on such liability
where no result occurs would be evidentiary rather than substantive in nature. That is, the
failure to establish liability for an omission would be due to the lack of convincing evidence
about the sufficiency of the omission as a basis for liability, rather than a categorical bar against
omission liability.
The difficulty seems deeper than that, though. After all, any "proof" that certain
conduct could or would have caused a result that did not occur is necessarily counterfactual
and relies on (justifiable) speculation rather than a conclusive evidentiary showing. The
problem here is that such a counterfactual demonstration seems unusually tough, and perhaps
impossible, where the basis of liability is inaction rather than action.
For a rare discussion that takes on these issues and seeks to elaborate an account of
omission liability independent of any need to demonstrate resulting harm, see Alexander &
Ferzan, supra note 15, at 385-90.
78. Alexander and Ferzan may achieve something similar by eliminating the possibility of
liability for incomplete attempts. Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 15, at 379 ("[W]e would
jettison incomplete attempts from the criminal law."). Indeed, since they view resulting harm as
irrelevant, they presumably would not have a separate category of"attempts" toward some crime
demanding a resulting harm, but would simply define the offense itself as the creation of a risk
of that harm. In other words, they might define a set of particular inchoate offenses resembling
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passes the threshold from being noncriminal to satisfying the generalized
conduct test for an incomplete attempt toward some other target offense.
Here, the omission itself would constitute the offense. This Article now turns
to the possibility of punishing inchoate omission by using such offenses
rather than by using a general attempt provision.
IV. SPECIFIC CRIMES INVOLVING HARMLESS INACTION
A. LAW
Attempt statutes are not the only means by which to punish inchoate
omissions. Legislatures can and do enact other, specific offenses whose
requirements allow for liability where an actor performs no act and causes
no harm. Indeed, hundreds of such offenses exist. The following survey does
not purport to be exhaustive, but is intended only to give a sense of how
many such offenses exist and the types of conduct they tend to address.
Generally, most of the offenses fall into one of two broad categories:
omissions that generate or fail to ameliorate some risk of physical injury, or
failures to comply with some specific obligation to provide required
information to government authorities or others.
1. Endangerment and Neglect
One common supplement to a general attempt provision, which
typically demands intent to cause harm, is an endangerment offense
enabling liability based on a showing of recklessness as to a risk of harm.
Twenty-eight states have a general reckless-endangerment offense. 79 One of
the offenses discussed in Part IV of this Article, rather than using a one-size-fits-all attempt
provision with a generalized conduct rule.
79. For twenty-five of these states, the offense explicitly requires recklessness or its
equivalent. SeeALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (LexisNexis 2005); A.ASKA STAT. § 11.41.250 (2008); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1201 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-208 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
63 (2007) (first degree); id. § 53a-64 (second degree); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 604 (2007)
(first degree); id. § 603 (second degree); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(b) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-713 (1993) (first degree); id. § 707-714 (second degree); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-5
(2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-2-2(b) (West Supp. 2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.060 (West
2006) (first-degree "wanton" endangerment); id. § 508.070 (second-degree "wanton"
endangerment); id. § 501.020(3) (providing a definition of "wantonly" that is similar to the
standard definition of "recklessness"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 211 (2006); id. § 213
(aggravated version); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-204 (LexisNexis 2002); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 631:3 (2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2004) (first degree); id. § 120.20
(second degree); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-03 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.195 (2007); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2705 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.05(a) (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-112 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1025
(1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.050 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 941.30 (2007-2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-504 (2007).
Three states have not adopted reckless endangerment only because they do not
recognize "recklessness" as a distinct culpability level. See FLA. STAT. § 784.05(1) (2008)
(defining an offense for "[w]hoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another person to
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these states (Georgia) explicitly refers to omissions in defining the offense,80
and another (Nevada) implicitly does so.81 For eleven other states,8 2 the
offenses may apply to endangering omissions as well as endangering acts, as
these states define their offenses to include reckless "conduct"8 3 and
separately define "conduct" to include omissions.84 Some uncertainty
remains, however, given that the typical provision requires conduct that
"creates" a risk of injury or "places" another in danger, and it might be
doubted that an omission can "create" such a risk or danger. A person's
inaction might constitute a failure to respond to a risk of injury that another
person faces and might even be seen as a cause of any injury that occurs, but
whether inaction itself can be said to create a risk is questionable. 85 Of the
remaining provisions, most are unclear about whether an omission can
persona! injury"; code does not define "culpable negligence"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-208
(2007) (defining the offense of "negligently engag[ing] in conduct that creates a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury"; Code defines negligence in section 45-2-101(43) to
embrace usual concepts of recklessness and negligence together); id. § 45-5-207 (defining a
similar offense for knowing endangerment); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.595(1) (2007) (referring to
"willful or wanton disregard"; code does not define "willful" or "wanton," though "wanton" is
likely similar to the modem formulation of recklessness).
80. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(b) (2007) (defining the offense as "disregarding a... risk
that [one's] act or omission will cause harm").
81. The provision imposes liability for "perform[ing] any act or neglect[ing] any duty
imposed by law." NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.595 (2007). The "neglect" basis of liability seems to
expand on and contrast with the reference to liability for "any act," apparently imposing
omission liability (and doing so with the usual requirement, i.e., failure to satisfy a legal duty).
82. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, New Hampshire, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah.
83. Seestatutes cited supra note 79.
84. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-3 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(7) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(2) (2008); RAW. REV. STAT. § 701-118(4) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625:11(I) (2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00(4) (McKinney 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.085(4) (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAr. § 103 (2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(10)
(Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (4) (2008).
Montana achieves this result by defining "conduct" to include "acts," and then
defining "act" to include omissions. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-208(1) (2007) (defining the
endangerment offense in terms of "conduct"); id. § 45-2-101(1), (15) (defining "act" and
"conduct"); see also supra note 56 (discussing states, including Montana, that define "act" to
include omissions).
85. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 2, at 267-78 (arguing against the claim that omissions can
be causes); Michael S. Moore, Reply, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1784-85
(1994) (reiterating the claim that omissions are not causes, though noting that Anglo-American
law sometimes treats them as if they are). For contrary views about the relationship between
omission, causation, and criminal responsibility, see generally Marcelo Ferrante, Causation in
Criminal Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 470 (2008); G6mez-Aller, supra note 16, at 429-43;
Jestis-Maria Silva Sdinchez, Criminal Omissions: Some Relevant Distinctions, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
452, 457-61 (2008).
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satisfy the offense.8 6 Only one state, Indiana, seems to demand an
affirmative act.87
In addition to the general endangerment offense, many states also have
various specific endangerment offenses allowing for liability based on
omissions that create risks but need not cause harm. These offenses can
generally be grouped into four categories. First, thirty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have particular offenses for endangering or neglecting
the welfare of a child.88 Some of these offenses apply only to the child's
86. Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and
Wyoming define the offense in terms of endangering "conduct," see statutes cited supra note 79,
but do not define the term "conduct," so it is not clear whether an omission might qualify.
Wyoming does define the phrase "course of conduct" for purposes of its stalking offense, and
that definition requires a "series of acts," see WO. STAr. ANN. § 6-2-506 (2007), so perhaps
Wyoming is less likely than the others to treat an omission as conduct.
Maine and North Dakota define the offense to apply when one "creates a substantial
risk," see statutes cited supra note 79, and both states broadly define the concept of "acting" to
include omissions. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 2(2) (Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-01-04(2) (Supp. 2007). Accordingly, these statutes presumably cover omissions as well as
affirmative acts-assuming, as noted in the text, that omissions can create a risk.
Arizona's provision refers to "endangering another person," ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1201(A) (2001), and Wisconsin's refers to one who "endangers another's safety," Wis.
STAT. § 941.30 (2007-2008). These statutes might apply to omissions and might even do so
more readily than the statutes that require risk creation; one's omission might endanger
another in a context where some outside force or event creates the initial threat of injury to
that person.
Similarly, Illinois refers to one who "endangers [another's] bodily safety." 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-5(a) (2006). The provision's later reference to "perform[ing] ... acts that...
endanger safety," id., might suggest that the statute excludes omissions, but Illinois defines "act"
to include omissions. See id. § 2-2.
Finally, Florida's provision refers to one who "exposes another person to personal
injury." FLA. STAT. § 784.05(1) (2008). It seems possible that inaction in the face of a risk or
threat could count as "exposing" another to injury.
87. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-2(b) (West Supp. 2008) (defining the offense to require that
one "perform[] ... an act"). Indiana's code does not define "act," but its provision discussing
the minimum conduct requirement for liability refers to "a person who omits to perform an
act," IND. CODE § 35-41-2-1(a) (1998), implying that "performing an act" involves some
affirmative act.
88. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.110 (2008); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3619 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-207 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a
(West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21(a)(1) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1102(a)(1),
(4), 1107 (2007); D.C. CODE § 22-1102 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 827.03(3) (2008); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-5-70(a), -12-1 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-903.5 (1993 & Supp. 2007); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-21.6, 130/2 (2006); IOWA CODE §§ 726.3, .6 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3608,
-3608a (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93.2.1
(2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 554 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13L (2006);
MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-39 (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 568.045,
.050 (Supp. 2008); MONT. CODEANN. § 45-5-622 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.508(2), 201.110
(2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (2007); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2005); N.M. STAT.
§ 306-1 (Supp. 2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
318.2 (Supp. 2008); OHIO. REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit
21, § 852.1 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.545-547 (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304 (Supp.
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parent 89 or legal guardian, but others apply to any adult who places a child
in danger. 90 A related, though slightly distinct, group of provisions imposes
liability for failure to provide support (such as food, clothing, or shelter) for
one's child or, under some statutes, one's spouse or parent. 91 Typically,
2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401 (Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041 (Vernon
Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-112.5 (2) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (2004); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 61-8D-3, -4 (LexisNexis 2005); Wis. STAT. § 948.21 (2007-2008); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-4-403(a) (ii) (2007).
89. For a thorough survey and analysis of the various obligations that criminal law imposes
based on familial relationships, including the duties of parents toward their children, see
generally Jennifer M. Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327 (2008). For an
argument that the law's impositions on parents should be more relaxed than its impositions on
other custodians of children, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Reply, Do Families Need Special Rules of
Criminal Law?: A Reply to Professors Collins, Leib, and Markel, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1425, 1433-35 (2008).
90. Some states have distinct subsections, or multiple sections, to address each category
separately. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(a) (LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. § 827.03(3) (2008); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-70 (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-21.6, 130/2 (2006); IOWA CODE § 726.3
(2009) (applying to parents and persons having custody of a child); id. § 726.6 (applying not
only to parents and persons having custody of a child, but also to guardians and those having
"control" over a child-where "control" is defined as "supervision," temporary supervision
without parental consent, or driving a car with the minor in it); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.508,
201.110 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) (McKinney
2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A)-(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.041 (b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8D-3, -4 (LexisNexis 2005);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-403 (2007). In a slight variation, some statutes are drafted to apply
generally to any adult but also specify in particular adults with legal custody of any child. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 554 (2006); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-5-39 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 568.045, .050 (Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
622 (2007). A statute in Delaware applies to legal guardians but also to any adult who commits
certain crimes while knowing that the crime is being witnessed by a child of that adult's family
or the victim's family. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1102(a)(4) (2007). Separately, Delaware also
imposes liability for any adult leaving certain items unattended that might endanger children.
Id. § 1107.
Other states have provisions whose terms simply apply generally to any adult (some say
"person"). See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.110(a) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-207(a) (1) (2006);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (a)(1) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3608, -3608a (2007); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 13L (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401
(Supp. 2008); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-5-112.5(2) (2008).
Still other states have statutes that are limited to adults with legal custody of a minor or
similarly recognized legal obligations. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3619 (2001); D.C. CODE
§ 22-1102 (2001); HAW. REv. STAT. § 709-903.5 (1993 & Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 530.060(1) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93.2.1(A) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-
4(a) (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852.1(A)
(2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.545-.547 (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304 (Supp. 2007); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (2004); Wis. STAT. § 948.21 (2007-2008). A Minnesota statute applies
mainly to legal guardians but has a subsection that applies to any adult who endangers a child
by giving them access to firearms. MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (1) (c) (2008).
91. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (2008) (child); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3611 (Supp.
2008) (spouse); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-401 (Supp. 2007) (child or spouse); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 270, 270a (West 2008) (child or spouse); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-304 (2007) (child, spouse,
or parent); FLA. STAT. § 827.06 (2008) (child or spouse); IDAHO CODE A,\,. § 18-401 (2004)
(child or spouse); IND. CODE §§ 35-46-1-5 to -7 (1998 & Supp. 2001) (child, spouse, or parent);
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these statutes do not directly require any resulting harm to the child or
spouse, though many are defined in terms of failing to provide "necessary"
support, and proof that the support was necessary might demand proof that
the absence of support caused some injury or harm. 92
Second, twenty-three states have offenses for endangering elderly,
incompetent, or otherwise vulnerable adults. 93 As with child-endangerment
offenses, these offenses sometimes are of general applicability and
sometimes impose a duty only on the person's guardian or caretaker. Of
course, these endangerment statutes also cover situations where the neglect
does in fact ripen into harm, often aggravating the offense grade based on
the resulting harm.
Third, using a sometimes-less-direct means of addressing what amounts
to endangerment, various offenses criminalize the failure of an official, or
other person bound by some public trust, to discharge his or her duty-
typically, a duty to protect others or ensure their safety. A couple of these
offenses apply broadly to any official who fails to perform his or her duty. 94
Others apply to specific actors, such as road overseers, 95 persons having
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3605 (2007) (child or spouse); MINN. STAT. § 609.378(1)(a)(1) (2008)
(child). For a general discussion and evaluation of these statutes, see Collins et al., supra note
89, at 1347-49, 1416-22.
92. Not all statutes have such a "necessity" requirement, and at least one state's provision
suggests that failures to provide "necessary" support need not cause harm in order to be
punishable. Minnesota's provision applies to one who "willfully deprives a child of necessary
food, clothing, shelter, health care, or supervision" where "the deprivation harms or is likely to
substantially harm the child's physical, mental, or emotional health." MINN. STAT.
§ 609.378(1)(a)(1) (2008) (emphases added). Accordingly, it seems at least possible that a
violation of these statutes could occur even absent any resulting harm.
93. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-203 (2006) (incompetent); id. § 5-28-103(c) ("endangered"
or "impaired" person); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1105 (2007) (incompetent); FLA. STAT.
§ 825.102(3)(a)(2) (2008) (elderly or disabled); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-905 (1993)
(incompetent); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1505 (Supp. 2008) ("vulnerable adult"); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-21(a)(2) (2006) (elderly or disabled); IOWA CODE § 726.3 (2009) ("dependent
person"); id. § 726.7 (resident of a healthcare facility); id. § 726.8 ("dependent adult"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3425 (2007) ("confined person," including a prisoner or a disabled, mentally
ill, mentally retarded, or involuntarily confined person); id. § 21-3437(a)(3) ("dependent
adult"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 555(1) (2006) ("dependent person"); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAw § 3-605 (LexisNexis 2002) ("vulnerable adult"); MINN. STAT. § 609.233 (2008)
("vulnerable adult"); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.184(1)(4) (2000) (elderly); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 639:3 (2007) (incompetent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-7 (West 2005) (incompetent); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 260.25 (McKinney 2008) (incompetent or physically disabled); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-31-07(2) (Supp. 2007) ("vulnerable adult"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.34 (LexisNexis
2006) (patient of care facility); id. § 2903.341 (mentally retarded or developmentally disabled);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 843.3 (Supp. 2008) ("vulnerable adult"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-46-2
(2006) (disabled); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-112.5(2) (2008) (elderly); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1378(a) (Supp. 2008) ("vulnerable adult"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-369(A) (2004)
("incapacitated adult"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-507 (2007) ("vulnerable adult").
94. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-11-37 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 580 (2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3006 (1998).
95. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-15-47 (2006).
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control of a public conveyance 96 (including specific offenses for a rail
conductor's failure to ring a bell or whistle before a crossing 97), seamen, 98
and owners of "dangerous animal [s]."99 Still others penalize specific failures
to perform a required act or take steps to prevent an identified threat, such
as neglecting to suppress a riot,' 0 0 pursue or confine an offender or
convict,101 investigate a fire, 10 2 or prevent a catastrophe.103 Some offenses
extend a duty to common citizens to assist in the performance of some
public service. For example, some offenses punish persons who disobey a
peace officer's demand for assistance in effectuating an arrest (or otherwise
enforcing the law),10 4 responding to a riot, ' 0 5 or fighting a fire. 106 All these
crimes are inchoate, as they require no resulting harm. The citizen's
inaction can lead to liability even when it does not actually impede the
official's ability to fulfill his or her duties, such as when the arrest is
successfully made anyway. Some of these offenses may contemplate
dereliction of the relevant public duty as risking, or even being, a harm
other than a threat to safety, but the nature of such a harm, if any, is not
specified and defies easy articulation. Most such offenses are more easily
seen as being concerned with inaction that jeopardizes others' personal
safety.
96. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-5.5 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 30 (2006); see
also OKLA. STAr. tit. 21, § 1255 (2001) (specific offense for railroad workers).
97. SeeIDAHO CODEANN. § 18-6002 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1253 (2001).
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 2196 (2006).
99. SeeKAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3418 (2007).
100. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 410 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 3 (2006).
101. See FLA. STAT. § 843.10 (2008) (criminalizing the act of negligently allowing a prisoner
in custody to escape); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-39 (2006) (criminalizing the act of "willfully and
corruptly refus[ing] to execute any lawful process . . . requiring the apprehension or
confinement of any person charged with a criminal offense"); id. § 97-11-35 (criminalizing the
act of "willfully neglect[ing] or refus[ing] to return any person committing any offense against
the laws").
The Florida statute may be seen as involving a resulting harm, since an offender's
escape is itself an injury to social interests. The corresponding Mississippi statute, however,
makes clear that liability for allowing a possible escape shall arise "whether such escape be
attempted or effected or not." MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-39 (2006).
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-69 (2007).
103. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-2(d) (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAr. § 3303 (2002).
104. See FLA. STAT. § 843.06 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1011 (1993 & Supp. 2007); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-8 (2006); IOWA CODE § 719.2 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, §§ 24-25
(2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.483 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-903 (2008); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 199.270 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 537-538 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.245
(2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-307 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-463 to -464 (2004); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-5-14 (LexisNexis 2005); Wis. STAT. § 946.40 (2007-2008).
105. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 2 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.523 (West
2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 574.060 (2000). Michigan also has a provision imposing a duty on
officials themselves to respond to a riot. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.524 (West 2004).
106. See OR. REV. STAT. § 162.255 (2007).
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Finally, about a dozen states expand liability beyond endangerment of
humans, criminalizing omissions that endanger animals as well. Some of
these offenses target the animal's owner, 107 while others apply to any person
who "confines" an animal and then fails to give it proper nourishment or
care.108 At least one such provision is even broader, applying not only to
owners or guardians but to anyone whose omission threatens the health of
an animal in certain ways or in certain contexts. 109
107. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(a) (2007) (imposing liability on any person who,
"having charge or custody of any animal, . . .fails to provide it with proper food, drink or
protection from the weather or abandons it"); D.C. CODE § 22-1011 (2001) (criminalizing the
failure of an "owner or person in charge" to provide proper food or shelter "for more than 5
consecutive hours"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-3-7(a) (West Supp. 2008) (criminalizing the
behavior of a person who "owns a vertebrate animal" and who "abandons or neglects" that
animal); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214310(a)(3) (2007) (making it a crime for a person "having
physical custody of any animal [to] intentionally fail[] to provide such food, potable water,
protection from the elements, opportunity for exercise and other care as is needed for the
health or well-being of such kind of animal"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.130(1) (b) (West 2006)
(making it a crime for a person to "[slubject[] any animal in his custody to cruel neglect");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-41-9 (2006) (requiring that the owner or person with custody provide
"necessary sustenance, food, [and] drink"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:8(I), (III)(f) (2007);
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.325 (2007) (making it a crime for a person with custody or control to
"fail[] to provide minimum care for an animal").
108. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247(a) (2007) (imposing liability on any person who,
"having impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such animal proper care or.. . fails to
supply any such animal with wholesome air, food and water"); FLA. STAT. § 828.13(2) (a) (2008);
IOWA CODE § 717B.3(1) (2009) (requiring that a person who "impounds or confines ... an
animal" provide sufficient food and water and, if the animal is a cat or dog, adequate shelter).
Note that these offenses impose omission liability, for it is not the confinement but the
subsequent neglect or failure to act (along with one's culpability as to the risks that such neglect
creates) that generates liability. The earlier act of confinement does not itself lead to criminal
liability, though it does give rise to the duty that grounds the potential for omission liability
based on the subsequent failure to act.
109. SeeW. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-19(a) (1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). This provision reads:
It is unlawful for any person to intentionally, knowingly or recklessly,
(B) abandon an animal;
(C) withhold,
(i) proper sustenance, including food or water;
(ii) shelter that protects from the elements of weather; or
(iii) medical treatment, necessary to sustain normal health and fimess or to
end the suffering of any animal; [or]
(E) leave an animal unattended and confined in a motor vehicle when physical
injury to or death of the animal is likely to result ....
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2. Failure to Disclose or Report
A second group of inchoate-omission offenses imposes liability for
failure to provide information where the law requires its provision.110 Many
offenses penalize failures to report required information to public
authorities, such as law-enforcement officials. For example, numerous
offenses criminalize various parties' failure to report known or likely
criminal activity-regardless of whether such failure actually impedes any
criminal investigation. The duty to report may cover various offenses,
111
including money laundering or other financial misconduct, 112
environmental violations,11 3  treason, 114  sexual assault,115  domestic
violence, 116 child pornography, 117 child abuse, 118 elder abuse, 119 animal
neglect, 120 crimes involving gunshot wounds, 121 and corruption in sporting
events. 122 Other offenses require provision of information necessary for
governmental recordkeeping or administration of services, such as
information affecting eligibility for government assistance 123 or information
regarding the ownership or sale of regulated tranquilizer guns. 124 Finally, a
110. For a more comprehensive survey of such offenses, see generally Thompson, supra
note 17.
111. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 268, § 40 (2006) (homicide, sexual assault, or armed
robbery); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (felony "in which serious
bodily injury or death may have resulted"); WIS. STAT. § 940.34(2) (b) (2007-2008) (creating a
reporting duty for a private detective "who has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is
being committed or has been committed").
112. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 3-5, 24-31 (citing and discussing various such
offenses).
113. See id. at 31-35.
114. SeeW. VA. CODEANN. § 61-1-3 (LexisNexis 2005).
115. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 760 (Supp. 2008).
116. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 10 & n.31 (summarizing statutes and citing other
sources).
117. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.693 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 22-24A-16 to -18 (2006).
118. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1169, 2258 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.765 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
119. See MINN. STAT. § 609.234 (2008); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.5093 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 30-
47-9 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1050(A) (2003).
120. SeeNEB.REV.STAT.§28-1017 (2008).
121. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4213 (2007) (gunshot wound or other serious wound
"apparently inflicted by a knife, ice pick, or other sharp or pointed instrument"); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 512 (2006); Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.350 (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-902
(2008) ("wound or injury of violence"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 631:6 (2007); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5106 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-48 (2002).
122. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29-3 (2006); R-I. GEN. LAws § 11-7-12 (2002).
123. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-29-12 (2006).
124. SeeNEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1209 to -1210 (2008).
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handful of offenses reverse the flow of required information, penalizing
public servants who fail to disclose conflicts of interest. 125
Probably the most common and well-known examples of criminal
provisions within this category are the offenses-some version of which has
been enacted in every state-that penalize convicted sex offenders' failure to
satisfy registration or notification requirements.126 These and other felon-
registration offenses are somewhat sui generis, however, because the
affirmative obligations they impose might be seen as part of the punishment
for the offender's earlier crime(s).
B. ENFORCEMENT
Some of the factors that might curb prosecutions for attempt by
omission seem likely to have similar force in the context of particular crimes
of inchoate omission, yet others do not. Unlike attempt, specific crimes can
and, as the examples indicate, often do demand only a reduced level of
culpability, such as recklessness or negligence, as a basis for liability. Also,
while prosecutors may struggle to conceptualize, much less explain to ajury,
the notion of inaction as a "substantial step" in the direction of a crime, in
these situations the inaction itself is squarely defined to fit within the
parameters of an offense.
And indeed, these offenses-particularly the endangerment offenses-
generate prosecutions for omissions more frequently than is the case under
the attempt statutes. A search of publicly available court opinions-which
reflect only a small fraction of all prosecutions-turns up a number of cases
involving situations where a defendant's inaction generates criminal liability
even though the inaction does not lead to any injury.'2 7 Some scenarios
recur, such as situations where an adult leaves an infant in a car for an
extended period of time on a very hot or cold day; 128 where an adult leaves
125. See ALA. CODE § 13A-10-62 (LexisNexis 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-308 (2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-109(4) (2008).
126. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process
and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172-78
(1999) (discussing these requirements).
127. For this project, searches were conducted in each relevant jurisdiction's case-opinion
databases on Lexis and/or Westlaw, using as search terms any of the jurisdiction's statutory
provisions whose elements allowed for inchoate-omission liability. Many of those provisions are
written so as to allow liability when harm occurs or when there is an affirmative act, so the vast
majority of retrieved cases involved fact patterns in which action, harm, or both were actually
present. Those cases were ignored. Many, though not all, of the remaining cases (i.e., the ones
that involved prosecution for an inchoate omission) are discussed in the text and footnotes in
this Section.
128. See People v. Jordan, 843 N.E.2d 870, 879-81 (Ill. 2006) (reviewing a child-
endangerment conviction of a father who left an infant in a car for up to forty minutes on a
twenty-degree day); State v. Todd, 183 S.W.3d 273, 275-76, 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming
a child-endangerment conviction of a mother who left a nine-year-old in a car on a ninety-four-
degree day while she gambled in a casino); State v. Warner, No. DC 03-55, 2003 Mont. Dist.
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drugs or other dangerous objects lying around the house in the immediate
presence of unsupervised children; 129 where officers enter a home to find
children in a state of apparent extended neglect (lying in excrement, clearly
underfed, etc.), though suffering no specific injuries and ultimately
recovering once given medical treatment; 130 or where an adult fails to
pursue immediate medical treatment for a sick or injured child, but later
treatment leads to a full recovery.' 3 ' In one extreme example, a father,
LEXIS 3162, at *1, *4 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2003) (affirming a child-endangerment
conviction of a mother who left her infant in a car on a thirty-five-degree day); State v. Obeidi,
155 P.3d 80, 81 & n.1, 84 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming a child-neglect conviction of a mother
who left a three-year-old and a one-year-old in a car for twenty to thirty minutes, even though
the weather created no specific safety concern); Cochener v. State, No. C14-91-00153-CR, 1992
Tex. App. LEXIS 1370, at *1-2, *8 (Tex. App. May 21, 1992) (affirming a child-abandonment
conviction of a mother who left a four-year-old in a car while shopping, at which point the child
left the car, walked across a parking lot, and was found crying by a store window).
At least one state has a specific criminal offense addressing this scenario and requiring
no resulting harm, thus defining an inchoate-omission crime. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.10
(Vernon 2003). There have been a number of recent cases involving similar abandonment but
resulting in the baby's death. SeeJennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for
Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 820-32 (2006) (reporting on an empirical
study of 130 hyperthermia cases involving children left in cars between 1998 and 2003).
129. See State v. Smith, 869 A.2d 171, 173, 178-79 (Conn. 2005) (affirming a child-
endangerment conviction where authorities found a one-year-old on the defendant's bed with a
packet of crack cocaine, though not mentioning whether the defendant was the child's parent
or guardian); State v. Fagan, 883 A.2d 8, 11, 15 n.7, 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (affirming a
child-endangerment conviction where authorities found toddlers in the defendant's bedroom
with razors and crack, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant claimed not to be the
children's legal guardian); State v. Sage, 977 S.W.2d 65, 67-68, 71-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(affirming a child-endangerment conviction of a mother who left her child in a house full of
chemicals and sharp objects); State v. Graham, 109 P.3d 285, 287, 291 (N.M. 2005) (affirming a
child-abuse conviction where officers executing a search warrant found two infants in an untidy
house with drugs throughout, including a marijuana bud in a crib); State v. Damofle, 750 P.2d
518, 519, 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming a "criminal mistreatment" conviction of parents
whose three children-aged five years, one-and-one-half years, and five months-lived in
unsanitary conditions and within easy reach of matches and gasoline, and holding that the
statute required no proof of injury to the children).
130. See People v. Harris, 48 Cal. Rptr. 677, 678-79, 682 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (affirming a
mother's child-endangerment conviction after authorities found her children-one of whom
had a dried bed sheet stuck to his skin-in a house with old food, excrement, and
"[c]ockroaches of all sizes . . .in every room"); Knight v. State, 505 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998) (affirming a child-cruelty conviction of the father of a malnourished child); State v.
Bachelder, 565 A.2d 96, 97 (Me. 1989) (affirming a child-endangerment conviction of a mother
who failed to feed, bathe, or clothe her children and who let them wander in the streets);
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 817 A.2d 485, 491-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (affirming a father's
child-endangerment conviction for raising his children in a filthy, foul-smelling home with
mice, maggots, structural damage, and no working furnace, and holding that the statute did not
require proof of actual injury).
131. See Withrow v. State, 619 S.E.2d 714, 715-17 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming a child-
cruelty conviction of a mother who failed to get treatment for three days after her boyfriend
abused her child); Wolf v. State, 540 S.E.2d 707, 708-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming a child-
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apparently intoxicated, stared for minutes at his burning car while his five-
year-old and two-year-old children were trapped inside, neither seeking to
rescue them nor responding to others who asked if anyone was inside;
ultimately, he stated that the children were inside, and another man rescued
them from the car. 132
Some cases involve children who have simply been left unattended;
typically, the children are later found by someone else, sometimes in a
public area. 133 In an Indiana case, the defendant was supposed to be
watching his girlfriend's five-year-old, but he instead left to help someone
move furniture a few blocks away; the child was later found "wandering the
street." 134 Similarly, in an Ohio case, a police officer found a two-year-old
about to step from the curb onto a street; upon the child's return to his
house, some 100 yards away, his mother said he had been gone for just five
or ten minutes. 135 Another Ohio case involved a bus driver who found an
unattended two-year-old wandering around a parking lot in the rain wearing
only a diaper. 136 In New Jersey, a mother was sentenced to eight years'
imprisonment for leaving her three children alone at home on a 100-degree
day with the windows closed and blinds drawn, where her brother found
them before they suffered any injury. 137 In one New York case, the
defendant left a child alone for over two hours; the court, questionably,
concluded that "leaving a child alone" is an act rather than an omission, so
the defendant could be found liable in spite of the lack of any legal duty
toward the child.138
As for the other broad category of harmless-inaction crimes-the
failure-to-report offenses-Sandra Guerra Thompson has conducted
cruelty conviction of a mother who failed to pursue treatment for her child, or authorize
treatment by others, after the child suffered a severe burn).
132. Steinecke v. State, No. 01-05-00813-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2898, at *2-4 (Tex.
App. Apr. 12, 2007).
133. See, e.g., State v. Branham, 743 A.2d 635, 637, 640 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (affirming a
child-endangerment conviction where a father left three children, all under the age of four,
alone in an apartment for about one hour, at which point the mother returned to find the
children home alone); Castillo v. State, No. 08-04-00377-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5342, at *I-
3, *24 (Tex. App. June 22, 2006) (affirming a child-abandonment conviction of a mother who
left her children alone overnight, giving responsibility to the eleven-year-old eldest child, who
in turn left the siblings alone and went to school the next morning); cf Morris v.
Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 436, 437-41 (Va. 2006) (reversing, by a 4-3 vote, a child-neglect
conviction of a mother whose children, ages five and two, were found playing in the woods near
the defendant's trailer while the defendant was inside sleeping).
134. Thames v. State, 653 N.E.2d 517,517 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
135. State v. Schaffer, 713 N.E.2d 450,450-52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
136. State v. Melvin, No. 21135, 2003 WL 1524567, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2003).
137. State v. D.V., 791 A.2d 304, 305 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
138. People v. Watson, 700 N.Y.S.2d 651, 654 (Crim. Ct. 1999).
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research into their enforcement. 139 Prosecutions for these crimes are
rare, 140 and those that do occur bear some factual resemblance to the child-
endangerment cases. For example, Thompson discusses a handful of
prosecutions in Texas against mothers who failed to report abuse or
molestation of their children by others. 141 The general rarity of prosecution
is not especially surprising, as the offenses likely exist mainly to give police
and prosecutors investigative leverage, enabling them to use the threat of
prosecution to obtain information for pursuing some other crime. 1
42
Interestingly, though, such laws can still have a significant impact, since the
legal duty they impose is sometimes used as the basis for bringing a civil
claim against a non-reporter for the failure to report. 1
43
In sum, it is clear that numerous inchoate-omission offenses are on the
books. Even a limited investigation indicates that authorities enforce such
offenses, generating convictions and punishment-perhaps not as an
everyday matter but not as an exceedingly rare matter either. Should we find
these laws, and their enforcement, disturbing, or are they an appropriate
exercise of authority? The next Part of this Article takes up that question.
V. EVALUATING CRIMES OF HARMLESS INACTION
Thus far, this Article has described the category of inchoate-omission
crimes and has shown that such crimes do exist. But should they exist? And
if so, in what form? This Part takes up those questions. Part V.A addresses
the normative question of whether such crimes can be justified or desirable,
and it answers that question in the affirmative.
There remains the second, formal question, which Part V.B addresses.
Parts III and IV explored, in the particular context of inchoate omissions,
two formally distinct ways of criminalizing behavior. One option is to write a
single provision with terms designed to have sufficient breadth to capture all
of the relevant behavior. The other is to write numerous specific provisions,
each of which captures a subset of the relevant behavior. The discussion in
139. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 15-16, 20-23, 33-34 (surveying various failure-to-
report cases).
140. See id. at 16 ("[P]rosecutors in most states do not invoke their reporting laws against
non-reporters, especially not non-reporters who are not professionals within certain categories
of mandatory reporters."); cf id. at 33 ("The CERCLA reporting statute has generated relatively
few published cases.").
141. See id. at 15-16.
142. Cf id. at 33 (noting that the pattern of enforcement of environmental reporting
statutes, which require offenders to report their own underlying violations, "suggests that
prosecutors use the reporting charge as a bargaining chip in less serious dumping offenses as a
means of extracting guilty pleas").
143. See id. at 7 ("Of special concern in drafting reporting statutes is the fact that, in some
areas of law, their primary use will be to create civil liability for non-reporters by creating a legal
duty under criminal law. Non-reporters of child abuse, for example, are rarely prosecuted, but
often are sued.").
1240 [2009]
A 7YEMPT BY OMISSION
this Part takes a step back to explore and evaluate these two methods of
designing criminal-law doctrine, considering any lessons that the inchoate-
omission category teaches about these general issues.
A. 7E SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
In the abstract, imposing criminal liability on a person who does not
act, and whose inaction causes no tangible harm, seems troubling. Such
liability raises the specter of thought crimes requiring the government to
prove hardly anything with respect to the defendant's actual behavior in the
world: neither any observable conduct nor any demonstrable change in a
preexisting state of affairs. 144 Given these concerns, the frequent criticism of
such inchoate-omission crimes as possession offenses is hardly surprising. 145
Further, many of the particular inchoate-omission crimes that exist on
the books threaten to expand the scope of criminal law into areas where it
might seem unsuitable or unsettling. For example, the various child-neglect
or elder-neglect offenses, if enforced overzealously, might lead to an
intrusion on intimate familial life, which seems best left to civil law or
beyond the scope of law altogether. Modern criminal law has increasingly
intervened in domestic life, sometimes laudably so, as with the increased
criminalization and prosecution of domestic abuse. 146 Yet even these
seemingly uncontroversial interventions can have a powerful, perhaps
negative, ancillary impact on family relationships, as Jeannie Suk has
recently described. 147
144. See Perlman, supra note 16, at 234-35. As Perlman explains:
[I]n a crime of omission, one is guilty of a lack of action, and the crime will be
simply having the intent to allow (through omission) something bad to occur.
Murderous child abandoning will be failing to act as you should while having the
intention (knowing or having it as your purpose) to have a harmful event occur as
a result of your inaction. What are we punishing in a case like this? We are not
punishing the harm, but only the intention to do the harm coupled with lack of
action to prevent it .... [N]ow it begins to look like the consequence-irrelevance
theory will punish people's intentions, rather than their actions. This is quite a
frightening prospect, for it begins to look like we are punishing Orwellian
"thought-crimes," and such punishment seems obviously unacceptable and
immoral. When consequences matter in crimes of omission, we do not punish for
intention alone, but rather intention plus harm caused by the intentional lack of
action. If consequences are irrelevant, we would punish intentions alone in cases of
omissions, and this is a good reason to reject the thesis of consequence-irrelevance.
Id.; see also G6mez-Aller, supra note 16, at 423 (noting that punishing unconsummated
omissions "[p ] erhaps... would be tantamount to punishing mere ideas or thoughts").
145. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing possession offenses).
146. SeeJeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE LJ. 2, 11-13 (2006) (describing
the development of the criminal law's role in addressing domestic violence).
147. See id. at 53-63 (arguing that domestic-violence protection orders result in "de facto
divorce" and strained relationships).
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More generally, using criminal law to punish mere negligence,
especially when the law does not even require overt action, runs the risk of
blurring the tort-crime distinction and reducing the moral authority of
criminal law as its domain expands to include not only serious
transgressions, but also low-grade-they are harmless, after all-instances of
neglect. Indeed, since inchoate-omission crimes by definition require no
resulting harm, they potentially expand liability even beyond what would be
available under tort law, where damages would be required.
The above concerns notwithstanding, it may still seem sensible, and
even desirable, to punish some culpable omissions that fail to cause harm. In
general, requiring harm for criminal liability introduces the potential for
"moral luck"-that is, a judgment of blame that depends on factors outside
the control of the person being blamed. 148 Numerous commentators who
oppose such judgments criticize criminal-law rules that base liability on, or
enhance liability because of, the occurrence of resulting harm. They claim
that the results of a person's conduct are irrelevant to a moral assessment of
the conduct, as those results are beyond the person's capacity for choice and
control. 149 Similarly, focusing on the distinction between action and
omission obscures a more proper consideration of whether the risks or
dangers a person created were a matter of her exercise of choice and her
capacity for control. 150 A person who culpably risks a prohibited harm
merits moral condemnation in equal measure whether the risk arises
through an affirmative act or a deliberate failure to act. 151
Allowing liability for harmless inaction, at least in some cases, may also
promote the utilitarian crime-control goals of the criminal law. Deterrence
148. The two pioneering articles on the subject, both entitled Moral Luck, were written by
Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams and were reprinted in a later book with the same title. See
Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK, supra, at 35; see also Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2009), http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2009/entries/moral-luck/.
149. See supra note 11 (noting the claim that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of resulting
harm should be irrelevant to the amount of criminal liability).
150. See Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 60, 60 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) (arguing that criminal
law's act requirement is better seen as a control requirement); cf Chiao, supra note 14, at 14-22
(arguing that the act requirement should be replaced by the "practical agency condition," and
contrasting this approach with Husak's control requirement).
151. See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 15, at 386 ("Omissions should be treated as on
par with volitions, not as equivalent to mere choosings (or future intentions) to risk."); id. at
388 ("Culpability for omissions mirrors culpability for risk-impositions, the only difference
being the complexity of the risk analysis."); Husak, supra note 150, at 77 ("Theorists who ...
defend the act requirement must struggle to explain why the criminal law should impose
liability only for acts-because persons may be morally responsible for a great many states of
affairs other than their acts."); id. at 82 ("Omissions provide the clearest example of a state of




and incapacitation are ill-served by making a fetish of the distinction
between action and omission. If a person's unwillingness to act or clear
disregard for others' interests creates an obvious danger, there is no reason
for the criminal law to wait until such danger translates into actual harm
before intervening. For crime-control purposes, the central consideration is
whether sufficient data exist to warrant a conclusion that punishment would
prevent this person or others from engaging in future conduct, either
affirmative acts or failures to act, that jeopardizes the interests the law seeks
to protect.
Further, practical constraints likely limit the potential for abuse or
other concerns with such crimes. First, the very possibility that harmless-
inaction cases will seem dubious or trivial makes it highly likely that
prosecutors will pursue only exceptional cases. Also, police departments are
unlikely to dedicate scarce investigative resources to the pursuit of these
offenses. Moreover, the difficulties of proof that attend omission cases-
demonstrating culpability where no overt act is undertaken in furtherance of
that culpability and demonstrating the person's awareness of the situation
and opportunity to act-should limit the application of liability, especially
when coupled with jurors' probable skepticism about a prosecution for
doing nothing and causing no harm.
In fact, a review of the actual cases involving prosecution of inchoate
omissions seems to confirm that these crimes are enforced narrowly, rarely,
and only where enforcement has some intuitive appeal. For example,
although the scope of the offenses as written may seem to threaten an
undue intrusion of law enforcement into domestic affairs, it seems that these
crimes are not, and are unlikely to be, investigated directly. Rather, in the
actual cases, only "public" displays of negligence-such as children who are
found alone in cars or playing in traffic-seem to attract the attention of law
enforcement. 15 2 Of course, this feature of inchoate-omission prosecutions
might suggest a subtler but still troubling tendency toward selection bias or
discrimination if poor people or minorities are more likely to be the subject
of intrusive searches or to otherwise lead their lives in public (or observed)
spaces, 15 3 while those with greater means can, to put it crudely, afford the
privacy to neglect their children without fear of prosecution. Yet such
concerns, if accurate, transcend the category of inchoate-omission liability
and raise broader issues-about not only law enforcement but housing
policy, race relations, the distribution of wealth, and so on-that are beyond
the scope of this Article.
It is difficult to come to any firm conclusion about the propriety of
inchoate-omission liability without additional data about the full extent of
152. See supra Part IV.B (describing factual settings giving rise to prosecutions for inchoate-
omission crimes).
153. I am indebted to Michael O'Hear for this observation.
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prosecutions for such crimes as well as equally significant, yet harder-to-
glean, data about how often law enforcers who are presented with violations
of these crimes decline to prosecute. Absent such data, it is unclear whether
the possibility of selective or biased enforcement of these offenses should be
troubling-or, to be more precise, whether these crimes create more, less,
or about the same amount of concern as any other category of criminal
offense.
Still, one important and perhaps surprising observation worth noting
here is the extent to which the issues surrounding harmless-inaction offenses
are empirical issues of this kind rather than more fundamental normative
issues. Looking at the underlying facts of the endangerment-by-omission
prosecutions that have occurred, a compelling case can be made that some
cases of harmless inaction are genuinely blameworthy and properly within
the reach of the criminal law. Similarly, failure-to-report situations have
generated significant outrage in cases where the law did not penalize the
failure of witnesses of serious crime to come forward, as in the notorious
Massachusetts barroom gang rape where no onlookers notified the police, 154
or when Kevin Cash watched a friend rape and murder a seven-year-old girl
and neither intervened nor reported the crime later. 155 Examination of the
inchoate-omission category as it plays out in reality, rather than on some
conceptual level removed from the particulars of human behavior and law-
enforcement practice, reveals a possible role for such offenses and also
suggests possible practical limitations that curb the potential for abuse.
One might even say that the reality poses problems for the theory,
rather than the other way around. Some of the more extreme cases of child
neglect that have been prosecuted under inchoate-omission statutes seem to
call out for moral blame and public condemnation, the lack of concrete
injury notwithstanding. 156 Imposing criminal liability in these cases poses a
challenge in terms of the classical objective requirements of criminal law,
because such cases involve neither harm nor any clear manifestation of
culpability in the form of action. Moreover, imposition of inchoate-omission
liability also challenges subjectivist visions that are willing to dispense with
objective requirements in favor of a focus on personal culpability. This is
because in child-neglect cases, the relevant offenses generally do not require
a conscious, subjective disregard for another's welfare (i.e., recklessness),
but only failure to satisfy some objective standard of proper diligence or
attention (i.e., negligence). Whether the facts of the prosecuted cases
suggest recklessness or merely negligence might be debatable, but in any
event, these cases seem to test the boundaries of most standard accounts of
154. SeeJennifer Bagby, Note, Justifications for State Bystander Intervention Statutes: Why Crime
Witnesses Should Be Required to Call for Help, 33 IND. L. REv. 571, 571 (2000) (discussing this case).
155. See ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 399-407 (providing the facts of the Cash case).
156. See supra Part IV.B (describing these cases).
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criminal liability, which demand some level of objective manifestation of
criminality, some degree of subjective culpability, or both. Liability in these
cases might accord best with a character-based or virtue-ethics account of
criminal liability, according to which a person is properly subject to
punishment based on the failure to recognize his obligations or to arrange
his priorities or preferences in such a way that his attention is on the proper
things. 157 To the extent that liability for harmless inaction seems to have
intuitive appeal, perhaps the virtue-ethics understanding also has some
appeal, at least as an explanatory account, if not as a normative justification.
Whatever theoretical justification, if any, supports the intuition that
these cases may warrant punishment, that intuition itself, if shared
sufficiently widely and deeply, may provide a reason to enable liability for
such cases. Criminal law may be most effective in promoting compliance
when its prohibitions track the community's shared sense of moral conduct,
and the criminal law's refusal to punish conduct that the community views as
blameworthy may undermine the law's moral standing and concomitant
ability to promote respect and adherence. 158
At any rate, it seems quite hasty to reject out of hand the possibility of
ever imposing liability for inchoate omissions. Indeed, instead of viewing the
issue as demanding a yes-or-no vote on the appropriateness of the category,
it might be wise to ask more focused, tactical questions about how the law
157. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to
Our Moral Culpability Judgments, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 59, 61 (Ellen Frankel Paul et
al. eds., 1990) ("Only a character-based conception of a moral agent's necessary attributes can
explain how th [e] capacity for moral responsiveness is developed and why it is sometimes fair to
blame actors who fail to exercise this capacity."); id. at 81 ("The ultimate basis for our
culpability may lie in our failure to do something about those aspects of our character that
make it so difficult for us to avoid engaging in morally objectionable conduct."); Kyron
Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431, 457 (1998) ("We punish
negligent actors, intoxicated and reckless actors, and those who make unreasonable mistakes
regarding elements of a crime because they exhibit in their acts a failure of practical
judgment."); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1479 (1995)
("[O]ne might be held liable for an omission not because it is a failure to act where action is
required, but because the failure itself evinces a lack of judgment, an absence of virtue.");
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 105, 151 (1996). Professor
Pillsbury asserts:
Motivations to perceive, or not perceive, . . . should be considered part of the
individual's base responsibility. Like urges to hurt or to help, perception priorities
help define the person....
We may blame persons for failing to perceive risks to others when we can trace
their lack of awareness to bad perception priorities. In such a case, we judge the
person guilty of a bad choice. In setting his or her perception priorities, the
individual assigned too low a priority to the value of other human beings.
Pillsbury, supra, at 151.
158. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL
LAw DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 21-23, 183-85 (2006).
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might facilitate prosecution in suitable cases while minimizing the risks of
over-enforcement. Accordingly, let us now turn to a brief consideration of
these questions of design.
B. THE SHAPE OF CPIMINAL LIABILITY
Codes can and do criminalize inchoate omissions by using a general
attempt provision, creating specific offenses, or employing a combination of
the two. Accordingly, the inchoate-omission situation presents important
questions about not only what to criminalize, but how to criminalize. One
key question about how to criminalize asks: Is it preferable to have a code
with few, relatively broad offenses (such as attempt), or numerous,
particular offenses (such as child neglect, elder neglect, failure to report,
dereliction of official duty, etc.)? I have referred to this basic distinction as
presenting the choice between a "thin" code, with fewer but broader
provisions, and a "thick" one, with many more precise provisions. 159 This
terminology gives some sense of what the codes might look like as a whole,
but it does not convey the equally important distinction with respect to the
features of each individual provision within each code. For the sum total of a
code to be thin, many specific portions of that code must be descriptively
thick, capturing a great deal of meaning in the space of a single concept or
term. For example, a code might make itself thinner by using a single
attempt provision in lieu of many varied inchoate offenses, but the single
attempt provision can do its work only if it uses terms that are capacious,
complex, and flexible-that is, subject to some indeterminacy and
ambiguity. Individual, precise provisions within a thick code, on the other
hand, may admit of thinner description.
Accordingly, a more apt metaphor for the comparison might describe
the differing codes not in terms of thickness but in terms of density.
Assuming that the content of the two codes is meant to be similar even
though the form differs, the more dense code (what I previously described
as a "thin" code) would need to contain as much weight as the less dense
one, but with less volume.
Geographic imagery might best convey a sense of the possible
geography of criminal law. 160 A "dense" code resembles a dense city (think
Manhattan): without a lot of total space, each piece of real estate (here, a
provision or offense) becomes important, so that small sections of the
code-even individual words-must support vast skyscrapers of interpretive
meaning. On the other hand, a code whose provisions take up a much larger
total amount of space-what we might call a "sprawling" code (think
159. See Cahill, supra note 11, at 887-89, 938-55 (detailing the use of "thick" and "thin"
codes).
160. Such are the analogies that strike someone who teaches both criminal law and
property. Nothing that follows should suggest, however, that my attitudes toward density versus
sprawl with respect to criminal codes track my sensibilities about good urban planning.
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Phoenix)-need not demand as much from each provision standing alone.
Neither layout is inherently superior; rather, each makes its own demands.
Dense codes require careful attention to the architecture and engineering
of each provision. Sprawling codes require more attention to the overall
plan, so that one can see how different parts of the map relate to each other.
What are the general advantages and drawbacks of adopting a dense
versus a sprawling code? In earlier work, I have explored criteria by which to
judge the quality and effectiveness of a criminal code. 161 Those criteria
reflect the importance of three general considerations. First, the code
should provide fair notice, which requires conduct rules (i.e., rules
describing ex ante what conduct is prohibited) that are both comprehensive
and clear. 162 Second, the code should promote ease of application, for the
sake of reducing both the cost of the system and the likelihood of improper
disparities across cases based on the discretion of individual enforcers. Ease
of application requires adjudicative rules (i.e., rules for determining ex post
which conduct violations will lead to liability) 163 that are similarly
comprehensive and clear.164 Third, the code should promote fair and
accurate outcomes, which requires rules that are substantively just and
appropriate-or at a minimum, not internally inconsistent- with respect to
both determining liability vel non and establishing the amount of liability
(i.e., the sentence). 165 An assessment of the merits of dense and sprawling
codes, then, should consider their strengths and weaknesses in advancing
these three goals.
With respect to notice, a dense code may be preferable to the extent
that its brevity makes it more accessible and enables a reader to obtain and
retain a clear grasp of the rules in their entirety. But dense codes' reliance
on broad terms and concepts might make their provisions so vague and
indeterminate as to provide little reliable guidance ex ante. Contrast, for
example, a sprawling set of justification provisions-detailing precisely
whether and what level of force may be used in particular contexts-with a
single dense provision defining justifiable force in terms of "reasonableness."
As is generally the case with legal formulations that employ standards rather
than rules-a distinction that the density-versus-sprawl distinction roughly
tracks166-the flexibility that gives a dense code the ability to achieve fair
161. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst
(and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) (establishing and applying a
system of evaluation for criminal codes).
162. See id. at 6-11.
163. For more on the distinction between conduct rules and adjudication rules, see id.
at 3-4.
164. See id. at 12-14.
165. See id. at 14-20.




case-by-case resolutions ex post also limits the code's transparency and
predictability.
Inchoate-omission crimes are a case in point. A general reference to a
failure to act or to an omission "constituting a substantial step"167 toward a
crime provides little guidance as to the situations in which one is bound to
affirmatively act or else risk criminal liability. Lest the scope of criminal
liability range too far, it seems far better to specify with some precision the
particular contexts, relationships, and situations that will trigger an
obligation to act. This is especially true where, as with many inchoate-
omission offenses, liability is based not only on an omission but on a
reduced, and rather vague, culpability standard such as negligence. An
unspecific reasonableness standard offers little direction regarding the
situations generating an affirmative obligation to help or protect others.
Clarity is crucial not only in describing the contours of omission liability, but
also in explaining the basis and scope of inchoate liability. Inchoate liability,
no less than omission liability, expands the reach of criminal law, for it
penalizes conduct that sometimes is entirely innocuous. Accordingly, it
should be incumbent on the law to specify the nature of the target harms
grounding the exercise of criminalization authority and the levels of risk,
short of actual harm, that suffice to support punishment. 168
One must bear in mind, however, that sprawling codes may give rise to
notice problems of their own. 169 Although specific offenses may be designed
to offer clearer notice about the scope of the criminal law, there is also the
contrary risk that overlong criminal codes make it more difficult for the
average citizen to understand what the criminal code commands. Rather
than promoting the principle of notice, today's criminal law creates an
impregnable network of prohibitions that no one but a criminal-law expert
can decipher.
The notice problem is further exacerbated by the increasing level of
criminalization, which is nowhere more problematic than with respect to the
creation of liability for inaction. As William Stuntz has put it, we are moving
"ever closer to a world in which the law on the books makes everyone a
felon." 70 Whereas a proposed bill that would generate blanket liability for
all manner of failures to act might raise questions about the proper
boundaries of criminalization, a legislature might not feel similar qualms
167. MODELPENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962).
168. See Michael T. Cahill, Grading Arson, 3 CalM. L. & PHIL. 79, 88-91 (2009) (discussing
concerns that arise when offenses such as arson address multiple harms or risks at once or fail
to specify the harms or risks that they are meant to address).
169. The balance of this Section's discussion draws on Cahill, supra note 11, at 936-38, 949-
55, and Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal
Codes, 56 HAsTINGs L.J. 633, 638-40 (2005).
170. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 511
(2001).
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about adopting a relatively narrow affirmative duty to act. Indeed, the
number of existing inchoate-omission offenses indicates that legislatures feel
quite comfortable enacting such crimes. Yet serial enactment of many
"small" crimes may have the cumulative effect of extending the scope of
criminal law as much as, or more than, a single broad provision would, while
avoiding the scrutiny that would attend enactment of the broad provision.
Accordingly, while the sprawling-code model seems more workable here,
vigilance is necessary to ensure that sprawl does not grow out of hand. One
way to curb undesirable sprawl may be to put a virtual wall around the
criminal code's borders, enacting general ex ante parameters or limitations-
whether substantive or procedural-to restrain the growth of subsequent,
more particular enactments. This Article discusses possible methods for
implementing such a strategy below.
With respect to application of the code, as noted earlier, a sprawling
code might facilitate easier implementation of any single provision, since
individual provisions should be more focused and use more precise
language, creating fewer interpretive difficulties. Again, the inchoate-
omission case study seems to support the sprawling-code model as the
preferable form for facilitating practical ease and normative appropriateness
in applying the law. Where the law imposes affirmative obligations to act, the
personal liberty interests of the populace are too strong, 171 and the
limitations on discretion and potential abuse too few, to rely on rules whose
content is unclear ex ante and is fleshed out only in the rules' subsequent
application.
Moreover, broad or ambiguous provisions run the risk of not only
extending liability too far, but also preventing liability from reaching far
enough. Especially in the context of omissions, where both the law and lay
sensibilities hesitate to impose affirmative duties to act, prosecutors or juries
may be reluctant to pursue or impose punishment if the broadly worded text
of a dense code does not state emphatically enough that failure to act may
lead to liability in the relevant situation.
The possible difficulty with applying sprawling codes involves the
relationship between their individual provisions. Adopting a vast array of
offenses might lead to interpretive and grading inconsistencies and
problems as enforcers attempt to determine how specific provisions relate to
one another and to broader general provisions, if any such provisions are
also adopted. 172 The relationship between multiple overlapping offenses is
often unclear on its face, and there is typically little guidance from other
171. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 53-57 (explaining how Good Samaritan and public-
welfare offenses may infringe on personal liberty).
172. See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 169, at 643-44 (offering examples from Illinois law
of specific endangerment offenses whose grading is inconsistent with the general
endangerment offense).
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sources as to how the legislature wanted or expected various provisions to
relate to one another.
These application issues tie into the third set of considerations-the
desire to achieve fair and accurate gradations of punishment. As a code
includes a greater number of increasingly refined distinctions in its offense
definitions, it becomes harder to make those distinctions meaningful by
placing the different offenses into different punishment categories, without
in turn adopting an unwieldy number of categories. To put it differently, it
may be easy to specify offense conduct with precision, but one will not
necessarily be able to specify the proper offense punishment with analogous
precision, because a narrowly defined form of conduct may merit very
different punishments in different circumstances.
Of course, a dense code may give rise to the opposite problem: rather
than making too many fine-grained distinctions whose ramifications are
unexplained or unclear, dense codes may engage in crude
oversimplifications that treat distinguishable situations alike. Examples
include a one-size-fits-all definition of attempt joined to a blanket rule
punishing all attempts as one offense grade lower than the completed crime,
or (perhaps worse) a single complicity provision creating a rule under which
any level of aid generates liability equivalent to performance of the offense
itself-a particularly dubious rule if an omission can also suffice to ground
complicity liability. 173
The inchoate-omission case study suggests that when dealing with
offenses that push the outer boundaries of criminalization authority,
precision rather than flexibility is crucial. Otherwise, neither law-
enforcement authorities nor citizens will have notice of how the law expects
them to behave. Thus, it is hardly surprising that in many jurisdictions,
numerous sprawling inchoate-omission offenses supplement a denser
attempt provision, even where the attempt provision seems to allow for
omission liability. 174 And it is those sprawling offenses rather than the
attempt provision that seem to generate actual prosecutions. 175
To be clear, then, density and sprawl are not discrete categories but
represent a range of approaches that can augment or complement, as well as
undercut or contradict, one another. The best way to maximize the relative
strengths of each type of code, while minimizing the weaknesses of each,
173. See supra note 5 (discussing liability for complicity by omission).
174. As noted in Part IILA, twenty-four states have attempt rules allowing for omission
liability. See supra notes 55-57, 60 and accompanying text. The discussion of more specific
inchoate-omission offenses in Part IV.A cites at least one such offense for each of those states.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing twelve states whose general
endangerment offenses allow for omission liability); supra notes 88-126 and accompanying text
(describing and citing more specific inchoate-omission crimes).
175. Compare supra Part Il.B (discussing the frequency of inchoate-omission prosecutions
under attempt statutes), with supra Part IV.B (discussing the frequency of inchoate-omission
prosecutions under other statutes).
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might be to adopt a hybrid or compromise approach. Though perhaps the
worst way to draft a code is to indiscriminately mix density and sprawl,176
much may be gained from deliberately using different drafting methods for
different types of rules, with a conscious awareness of how they will relate to
each other.
One option is to adopt a dense code but to supplement its broad rules
with precise, narrow evidentiary rules. The Model Penal Code (the "Code")
employs such a method with its conduct rule for attempt and its felony-
murder formulation. 177 As a general matter, having a general attempt
provision whose terms can apply to efforts toward a wide range of possible
target offenses reflects a dense approach to code drafting.178 Accordingly,
the Code's attempt provision, like any general attempt provision, employs a
vague standard to define the amount of conduct necessary for an attempt:
one must engage in a "substantial step" toward the offense. 179 The Code
provides additional guidance, however, by specifying numerous types of
particular conduct that, if shown, will satisfy the prosecution's burden of
production as to the "substantial step" element. 80 The Code defines murder
in terms of the somewhat fuzzy mental state of "extreme indifference to the
value of human life," but adds some clarity by providing a rebuttable
presumption of such indifference where the offender causes death in the
course of certain felonies.'18 Similar rules might be crafted in other
contexts. For example, an inchoate offense that requires the offender to
create a "substantial risk" of harm might be supplemented with rules that
allow the factfinder to infer such risk from specified acts or omissions. Such
rules enable consistency, provide clearer guidance, and facilitate
prosecution without imposing an irrebuttable presumption that the conduct
created a prohibited risk-as some current provisions effectively do by
defining offenses solely in terms of conduct and not explicitly demanding
the creation of an actual risk of harm.
Another option would be for the legislature to adopt a dense criminal
code while simultaneously adopting a more sprawling official commentary to
the code-again, perhaps following the Model Penal Code in form, even if
not in substance-and giving that commentary legal force.' 8 2 The
commentary could offer clear and precise illustrations of how the code
should apply to predictable and recurring situations, while the code itself
176. See Cahill, supra note 11, at 888-89, 952-55 (discussing the dangers of mixing "thick"
and "thin" codes).
177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1962) (felony-murder provision).
178. See Cahill, supra note 11, at 887 (noting that the use of broad attempt provisions
represents a "thin" approach to code drafting).
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962).
180. Id. § 5.01 (2).
181. Id. § 210.2(1) (b).
182. See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 169, at 654-55 (discussing this technique).
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would retain the flexibility to accommodate unforeseen cases. If the
legislature wanted to clarify that specific conduct fell within the terms of an
existing offense, it could add an illustration to the commentary to this effect
instead of creating an entirely new offense with elements that would almost
entirely replicate the already-existing offense and might fail to make explicit
reference to the relevant underlying harms it addresses. In this way, the code
itself could be consistent, concise, and direct in specifying the general harms
of concern to the criminal law, with fewer new offenses being added and less
overlap, confusion, and contradiction being created.
VI. CONCLUSION
Zero act plus zero harm adding up to one crime is, surprisingly, not
faulty math. The accuracy of this legal sum is empirically observable and
normatively defensible. Moreover, here, as elsewhere, empirical observation
and normative analysis can fruitfully interact. Too often, theorists and other
legal commentators address issues such as the proper scope of criminal
liability at a purely conceptual level, paying little regard either to how the
theoretical resolution of these issues might best be cemented into workable
doctrine or to how real-world legal institutions are already confronting, and
finding practical ways to address, the issues in question. At the same time,
critical examination, rather than unquestioning acceptance of existing
practices, is obviously essential. This Article has sought to pursue such a
reflective equilibrium in considering the problem of criminal liability for
harmless inaction, as the resolution of that problem has serious
ramifications for the scope and content of criminal law both in principle
and in practice.
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